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INTRODUCTION
The story behind In re Marriage of JB. and H.B.1 starts typically
enough: J.B. and H.B. married in their home state of Massachusetts in
2006, and then, in 2008, moved to Texas. They apparently grew apart,
however, as they separated in November 2008. J.B. filed for divorce in
early 2009.3
Because J.B. and H.B. are of the same sex,4 however, seeking that
divorce came with enormous complications. The Texas attorney
general intervened in their divorce action to prevent the court from
hearing it and appealed when his intervention was denied.! On appeal,
the Texas Court of Appeals agreed with the attorney general that,
under state law that precludes giving "any legal effect" to same-sex
marriages,' Texas courts lacked the authority to even entertain the
action for J.B. and H.B.'s divorce, much less grant it.' "A Texas court,"
it held, "has no more power to issue a divorce decree for a same-sex
marriage than it does to administer the estate of a living person."'
Such a disposition might not create substantial difficulties for J.B.
and H.B. if they were able to travel back to Massachusetts, the "state
of celebration" of their marriage, to obtain a divorce. But
Massachusetts law generally limits divorce to couples domiciled there
t BA 2004, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2012, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 326 SW3d 654 (Tex App 2010), briefs on the merits requested, No 11-0024 (Tex Aug 5,2011).
2 J.B., 326 SW3d at 659.
3 These facts are drawn from the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. In re
Marriage of JB. and H.B., No DF-09-1074, slip op at 1-2 (Tex, Dist Ct 302d Jud Dist, Dec 7,2009).
4 See J.B.,326 SW3d at 658-59.
5 Id at 659. See also Brief of the State of Texas, In re Marriage of l.B. and H.B.,No 05-09-
01170-CV, *3,5 (Tex App filed Jan 5,2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 1367402).
6 326 SW3d at 665, citing Tex Fam Code Ann § 6.204 and Tex Const Art 1, § 32.
7 J.B., 326 SW3d at 665 (holding that § 6.204(c) of the Texas Family Code removes
jurisdiction from the trial court because granting jurisdiction would give effect to the same-sex
marriage).
8 J.B., 326 SW3d at 666, quoting Mireles v Mireles,2009 WL 884815, *2 (Tex App).
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or residing there for at least one year.' Thus, IB. and H.B. cannot
obtain a divorce in Massachusetts unless they leave their new home.
And similar laws make residence or domicile a prerequisite for
dissolving a marriage in almost every US state.o
For J.B. and H.B., the consequence of this situation is continued
legal limbo." Texas's hostility to their relationship, combined with the
strict jurisdictional requirements for divorce, means that J.B. and H.B.
will be simply unable to obtain a divorce as long as they both reside in
Texas.
Such an inability to divorce works an immense hardship on same-
sex couples such as J.B. and H.B.12 Consider that if one spouse travels
to a state that does recognize such relationships, he is still married-a
fact that generally confers substantive rights on his spouse, such as the
ability to make life-or-death medical decisions." And even if neither
spouse travels outside the state in which they both live (the
"domiciliary state"), their inability to divorce still may work a
significant hardship. They will be unable to access adversarial court
procedures, such as those dividing marital property, for the orderly
unwinding of their affairs. They may also be ineligible for certain
benefits, such as spousal maintenance, automatic orders to change
their names, or tax exemptions for the transfer of assets pursuant to a
marital settlement. And the courts may refuse to recognize the
maritally derived relationship between a nonbiological parent and her
child, treating them instead as legal strangers. This may not only
deprive one parent of her eligibility for custody, visitation, or child
9 See Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 208, §§ 4-5; Cerutti-O'Brien v Cerutti-O'Brien, 928 NE2d 1002,
1004-07 (Mass App 2010) (upholding refusal to entertain a same-sex divorce action when one party
had not established domicile in Massachusetts).
10 See Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39 Wm & Mary L
Rev 1, 19-24 (1997) (noting that, exemptions for military personnel aside, those few states that
deviate from the domicile requirement still require residence). Domicile is distinguished from
residence in that the former requires an intent to stay. See, for example, Mas v Perry, 489 F2d 1396,
1399 (5th Cir 1974).
11 For a discussion of the possibility-raised in dicta by the JB. court-that such parties
might be able to void their marriages, see text accompanying notes 47-49.
12 The Supreme Court has recognized that the state monopoly on the dissolution of the
marriage relationship implicates important due process concerns. See Boddie v Connecticut,
401 US 371, 375-77 (1971). This Comment limits itself to arguments that do not rely upon a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in divorce. See Part III.A. Nevertheless, the Court's
holding in Boddie highlights the signal importance of access to divorce.
13 States with marriage and civil union laws often have statutes explicitly designed to provide
for such recognition. See, for example, Conn Gen Stat Ann § 46b-28a (West 2009 & Supp 2011)
(recognizing out-of-state civil unions as marriages). This also causes immense complications if
either party chooses to remarry, although a full treatment of the myriad complications that might
arise is beyond the scope of this Comment. Consider also that if one party does eventually take up
residence in another state, the parties will have been married longer than either intended-a fact
that may affect the postmarital division of assets.
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support, but also may deprive the child of his right to support from
that parent."
This Comment suggests that the best solution for same-sex
couples like J.B. and H.B.-that is, those same-sex couples in
marriages or civil unions who have migrated to states hostile to their
relationships-is for states that perform these unions to provide fora
for dissolving them." In four such states, legislatures enacting civil
union laws" have done precisely that by conferring on courts in their
states subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve civil unions performed
there, even if neither spouse is still a resident. These statutes, which
have heretofore gone almost entirely unnoticed by legal scholarship,"
would at least allow couples like J.B. and H.B. to return to the state
where they obtained their marriage in order to settle their affairs.
That these states have loosened their own statutory requirements
of subject matter jurisdiction, however, does not mean that state-of-
celebration divorce actions are based on sufficient personal
14 For cases treating nonbiological or nonadoptive mothers as legal strangers to their
children, see, for example, Janice M. v Margaret K., 948 A2d 73, 84-93 (Md 2008); Smith v
Gordon, 968 A2d 1, 9-16 (Del 2009), revd by Act of July 6, 2009, 77 Del Laws ch 97. See also
Smith v Guest, 16 A3d 920, 924 (Del 2011) (noting Gordon's abrogation by the Delaware
legislature).
15 Such a solution represents a break with the existing literature, which focuses entirely on
solutions that will force states such as Texas to perform these divorces. For a review of the extant
literature, see note 94.
16 Unless otherwise specified, this Comment, when referring to same-sex civil unions,
includes domestic partnerships conferring substantively all of the rights and benefits of
marriage. Such a definition excludes domestic partnerships (or other structures) available in
certain states that provide only a limited, enumerated set of benefits. See, for example, Colo
Rev Stat § 15-22-101 et seq.
In October 2011, as this Comment was going to print, California passed a law permitting
same-sex couples who married there (during the period in mid-2008 before such marriages were
outlawed by referendum) to dissolve their relationships there "in accordance with California
law." Act of October 9,2011 § 4,2011 Cal Legis Serv ch 721, codified at Cal Fam Code § 2320(b).
While the timing of the law's passage prevents more expansive discussion here, it is notable for
purposes of the constitutional analysis undertaken in Part IV that this essentially retroactive
statute does not claim to operate via the parties' consent, but-consistent with this Comment's
recommendations -does prohibit evasive divorces by limiting itself to circumstances in which
"[n]either party to the marriage resides in a jurisdiction that will dissolve the marriage." Act of
October 9,2011 § 4, Cal Fam Code § 2320(b). See also Part III.B.
17 The jurisdictional barriers to nondomiciliary divorces described in Part II of this
Comment no doubt contribute to this inattention. See, for example, Colleen McNichols Ramais,
Note, 'Til Death Do You Part ... and This Time We Mean It: Denial of Access to Divorce for
Same-Sex Couples, 2010 U Ill L Rev 1013, 1037-38 (dismissing the possibility of granting same-
sex divorces in the state of celebration as creating jurisdictionally defective divorces that would
not be entitled to full faith and credit).
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jurisdiction to entitle those state courts to exert their control over
both parties-a prerequisite for the validity of any such decree." The
Supreme Court's decision in Williams v North Carolinal9 (Williams II)
renders domicile a constitutional prerequisite for personal jurisdiction
over divorce20 and therefore calls into question the validity of divorce
decrees issued in the state of celebration. This poses a significant
constitutional hurdle to any widespread acceptance of the solution
advocated here.
This Comment seeks to resolve the jurisdictional barriers that
may prevent more widespread adoption of state-of-celebration
divorce statutes by arguing that the constitutional concerns
undergirding the domicile requirement in Williams II simply do not
apply to same-sex divorces granted in the state of celebration, at least
when the couple originally lived there21 and the parties' current state
will not grant them a divorce. It thus contends that state-of-
celebration divorce decrees are not invalid simply because the parties
were not domiciled in the state where they were granted.
The Comment proceeds first by examining the twin barriers that
prevent migratory same-sex couples from obtaining divorces: Part I
establishes the reasons why same-sex couples who have left states that
perform same-sex marriages and civil unions are currently unable to
dissolve these statuses where they live. Part II examines the domicile
rule of Williams II, which appears to establish a constitutional barrier
to the ability of same-sex couples to obtain divorces in any other state,
including the state where they originally obtained their marriage or
civil union.
Part III briefly examines the key features of the legislative
solutions adopted in California, Delaware, Illinois, and Oregon that
provide for dissolution of any civil union contracted in those states-
solutions which this Comment advocates as a model for legislative
action in other same-sex marriage friendly states. Part IV then
examines whether such divorce actions would be founded on
sufficient personal jurisdiction, given the domicile rule. It argues that
the domicile rule expounded in Williams II simply should not apply to
18 See Part II. Personal jurisdiction is also a prerequisite for judgments to be entitled to full
faith and credit in other states. See Thompson v Whitman, 85 US (18 Wall) 457, 462-63 (1873);
Williams v North Carolina (Williams II), 325 US 226,229 (1945).
19 325 US 226 (1945).
20 Id at 238. For more on the personal jurisdiction issues raised by divorce actions, see Part II.
21 This Comment does not address the situation in which a couple has temporarily left its
home state to obtain a marriage that could not be validly performed there. See text
accompanying notes 29-32. See also Part III.
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same-sex couples who validly marry in their home state and later
move to another state that refuses to recognize their marriage.
I. THE FIRST BARRIER TO SAME-SEX DIVORCE: THE REFUSAL TO
LEGALLY RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS
The most obvious forum for same-sex couples to obtain divorces
would be the state where they live. This Part examines the legal
reasons why same-sex couples who have moved to certain states are
currently unable to obtain divorces there.
Same-sex couples in a number of states have successfully gained
either the freedom to marry2 or the rights and benefits of marriage
under another name such as civil unions or domestic partnerships.2
Yet thirty states have also passed constitutional amendments that bar
performing-or often even recognizing-same-sex marriages or civil
unions;2 and even more have passed statutes seeking to accomplish
the same goals. As the analysis below will show, these differences in
the extent to which states will recognize and perform same-sex
marriages, when combined with the various background rules states
have adopted governing the respect generally afforded to all out-of-
state marriages (same-sex or not), have resulted in a treacherous and
complicated patchwork of recognition for same-sex couples in
marriages or civil unions.
Comity principles generally guide the recognition of marriages,
and the resultant performance of divorces, in states other than those
in which they were performed.26 While these principles come into play
22 See, for example, 15 Vt Stat Ann § 8; Varnum v Brien, 763 NW2d 862, 882-84, 896-907
(Iowa 2009). For a regularly updated list of the jurisdictions performing same-sex marriages and
civil unions and where state constitutional provisions target same-sex relationships, see Status of
Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide (Lambda Legal 2011), online at http://www.lambdalegal.org
/publications/articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (visited Aug 29, 2011).
23 See, for example, Nev Rev Stat § 122A.100; Lewis v Harris, 908 A2d 196,223-24 (NJ 2006).
24 See, for example, Alaska Const Art I § 25; Va Const Art I, § 15-A. Hawaii's constitutional
amendment does not explicitly bar same-sex marriages but authorizes the state legislature to do
so. Hawaii Const Art I, § 23.
25 See, for example, NC Gen Stat § 51-1.2. For a 2005 compilation of such statutes, see
Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A
Handbook for Judges, 153 U Pa L Rev 2143,2165-94 (2005).
In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub L 104-199,
110 Stat 2419, codified at 1 USC § 7 and 28 USC § 1738C (1996), which purports to enable states
to deny recognition to these same-sex marriages. See DOMA § 2(a), 28 USC § 1738C. DOMA
purports to enable these states to deny recognition, but nothing in DOMA compels or even
suggests that states will depart from the normal comity rules governing recognition of out-of-
state marriages. See Mark Strasser, The Legal Landscape Post-DOMA, 13 J Gender Race &
Just 153,157 (2009).
26 See Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross
State Lines 28-50 (Yale 2006).
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any time a marriage performed in one state is not available in
another, the role of comity principles was particularly prominent
historically when numerous states refused to perform interracial
marriages." Under these principles, a marriage does not simply
disappear when couples domiciled in a state that permitted a
particular marriage move to another state that does not; rather, such
"migratory" marriages have historically (although not universally)
been entitled to respect.29 Though this rule may seem surprising, there
are a number of good reasons for it, not the least of which is the fact
that a contrary rule would allow one spouse to abandon his marital
obligations by moving to states that do not respect his marriage."
A different situation is created when couples leave their home
state to enter into a marriage that would be forbidden there. Such
"'evasive" marriages have enjoyed far less respect than migratory
marriages; the normal rule is that states may refuse to recognize these
marriages or even declare them void," although some states
(including, notably, New York) have policies of recognizing even these
27 New York, for example, once forbade the adulterous party to a divorce from remarrying
within a certain number of years. See Van Voorhis v Brintnall, 86 NY 18,18 (1881). And a similar
situation would be created if one party to a marriage were, for example, too young to consent to
marriage in another state.
28 See Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States at 28-50 (cited in note 26).
29 See id at 42-47 (collecting cases). See also id at 106-10; Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts of Laws § 283(2) ("A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong
public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of marriage.").
A general exception from recognition is arguably available for marriages that violate the
"strong public policy" of a state. As Koppelman describes, this public policy exception has never
been applied to marriages that were regularly performed by US states. See Koppelman, 153 U Pa
L Rev at 2146-53 (cited in note 25).
30 Courts have recognized this potential for evasion for quite some time. See Medway v
Needham, 16 Mass 157, 159 (1819). See also Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States at 71-72
(cited in note 26) (arguing that a blanket nonrecognition rule for same-sex marriages creates
opportunities for abuse by those seeking to void a marriage without acquiring obligations for
spousal or child support).
31 See Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States at 37-39, 102-06 (cited in note 26); Larry
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception,
106 Yale L J 1965, 1970 (1997) (noting the "obvious difference between a couple that recently
married outside a state to evade that state's marriage restrictions and a couple that moved into
the state after living together for twenty years in a place that recognized their union"). See also
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 283 comment j (noting that an evasive marriage
may be invalidated "when it violated a strong policy of a state where at least one of the spouses
was domiciled at the time of the marriage and where both made their home immediately
thereafter" because the domiciliary state "may have an interest sufficiently great to justify the
invalidation").
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marriages.32 Because of this difference in the respect traditionally
afforded to migratory and evasive marriages, this Comment limits itself
to divorces of migratory same-sex marriages like the one at issue in J. B.
The availability of divorce for a marriage contracted out of state
usually depends on whether the marriage itself will be recognized. In
some instances, however, states have not adopted an all-or-nothing
policy regarding recognition- instead of refusing entirely to recognize
a marriage, they may recognize the particular "incident" of marriage
at stake, such as granting a divorce, settling an estate, or paying a
workmen's compensation claim.33 Such limited recognition may be
called for whenever the public policy that militates against more
blanket recognition would not be offended in the more limited
circumstance.
In the same-sex marriage context, some states have followed
these historical patterns. Certain states have refused to recognize
evasive same-sex marriages.34 Other states have followed their
traditions of recognizing even evasive marriages that they themselves
would not perform. For example, married same-sex couples in New
York were entitled to almost all the rights and benefits of marriage,
even before they were legally allowed to marry in that state." Notably,
32 See In re May's Estate, 114 NE2d 4,6-7 (NY 1953) (recognizing an uncle-niece marriage
validly performed in Rhode Island, even though such marriage would be illegal if performed in
New York); Van Voorhis, 86 NY at 22-25,32-37.
33 See Barbara J. Cox, Using an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When Considering
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships,
13 Widener L J 699, 718-29 (2004) (discussing theoretical accounts of this principle and
applications of it by courts). See also, for example, In re Bir's Estate, 188 P2d 499, 501-02 (Cal
App 1943) (recognizing a polygamous marriage so that an estate could be equally divided
between wives); Succession of Caballero v The Executor, 75 La Ann 573, 574-78 (La 1872)
(recognizing a Spanish interracial marriage to establish legitimacy of legatee); Langan v State
Farm Fire and Casualty, 849 NYS2d 105, 109-10 (NY App 2007) (Rose dissenting) (arguing for
such an approach with regard to workmen's compensation benefits).
34 See, for example, Hennefeld v Township of Montclair, 22 NJ Tax 166, 178--84 (2005)
(noting the "public policy of this state against same-sex marriage" and refusing to recognize
Canadian marriage), superseded by Lewis, 908 A2d at 224.
35 Lewis v New York State Department of Civil Service, 872 NYS2d 578, 582-84 (NY App
Div 2009) (upholding the New York Department of Civil Service's recognition of same-sex
marriages from other jurisdictions for the purposes of granting access to spousal benefits), affd
on other grounds, Godfrey v Spano, 920 NE2d 328, 335-36 (NY 2009); Martinez v County of
Monroe, 850 NYS2d 740,742-43 (NY App Div 2008) (recognizing as valid in New York validly
performed out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples). These recognition precedents have been
effectively superceded by New York's recently enacted Marriage Equality Act, under which
same-sex couples may now obtain marriages in that state. Marriage Equality Act § 3, 2009 NY
Sess Laws ch 95, codified at NY Domestic Relations Law § 10-a.
Certain state attorneys general have also opined that their states should recognize same-sex
marriages. See Gary K. King, Opinion No 11-01, NM Op Atty Gen, 2-5 (Jan 4,2011) (available
on Westlaw at 2011 WL 111243) (opining that New Mexico should recognize marriages
performed out of state); Douglas F Gansler, Marriage- Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex
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some states that would not otherwise recognize civil unions have
recognized them for the limited purpose of dissolving them.
But the more common experience in the area of same-sex
marriage has been a marked departure from historical comity
principles, particularly in the respect afforded to migratory marriages.
As exemplified by the Texas appellate opinion with which this
Comment began,37 courts in most states have been entirely dismissive
of claims for the recognition of same-sex marriages and civil unions-
whether migratory or evasive-even when asked only to dissolve
them. In fact, the attorney general of Texas has been proactive in
intervening in the dissolution actions of same-sex couples, thus
successfully preventing these couples from obtaining divorces." The
Pennsylvania attorney general recently intervened in a similar case,
with the same result.39 And even absent intervention by state officials,
courts in both Indiana" and Rhode Island" have refused to exercise
jurisdiction over actions to dissolve same-sex marriages.
The Rhode Island result is perhaps the most glaring deviation
from historical comity principles, because that state has no statute or
constitutional amendment that prohibits recognizing a same-sex
Marriage That Is Valid in the State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Md Op
Atty Gen 3, 29-51, 53-55 (Feb 23, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 886002) (collecting
marriage recognition precedents and reaching the same conclusion in Maryland).
36 Dickerson v Thompson, 897 NYS2d 298, 300-02 (NY App Div 2009) (finding New
York's court of general jurisdiction had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain action for
dissolution of Vermont civil union, even though New York did not recognize civil unions); Alons
v Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, 698 NW2d 858, 869-74 (Iowa 2005) (refusing to
allow collateral attack on lower court dissolution of Vermont civil union). See also In re Marriage
of Gorman, No 02-D-292, slip op at 2 (W Va, Fain Ct, Jan 3,2003) (dissolving civil union); Fricke
v Townsend, No 07-CV-57, slip op at 1 (Me, Super Ct, Nov 29,2007) (same).
37 JB., 326 SW3d at 670.
38 While the attorney general may intervene as a matter of right when, as in JB., a
constitutional challenge is made to the state's marriage law, see Tex Civ Prac and Remedies
Code § 37.006(b), the attorney general has also intervened even when no such challenge was
present. See Texas v Naylor, 330 SW3d 434, 443-44 (Tex App 2011) (denying as untimely the
post-judgment intervention by the state attorney general when no constitutional issue was
raised); Office of the Attorney General of Texas Greg Abbott, Press Release, Judge Vacates
Order in Beaumont Divorce Case after Attorney GeneralAbbott Intervenes (Mar 28,2003), online
at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/release.php?print=1&id=104 (visited Sept 1,2011).
39 See Kern v Taney, 11 Pa D & C 5th 558, 559-60, 576 (Pa Com P 2010) (noting
intervention of state attorney general after the court sua sponte raised jurisdictional concerns,
and finding that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant a same-sex divorce).
40 In re Marriage of Ranzy and Chism, No 49D12-0903-DR-014654, slip op at 3 (Ind Super
Ct, Sept 4, 2009) (finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action to dissolve a
same-sex marriage performed in Canada, and noting uncertainty as to the where the parties
resided at the time of celebration).
41 Chambers v Ormiston, 935 A2d 956, 961-63 (RI 2007) (holding that the Rhode Island
Family Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action to dissolve a same-sex
marriage, arguing that the statutory grant of authority to the Family Court should be given the
meaning it had at its passage in 1961).
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marriage. In cases such as these, judicial construction expands upon
statutes that prohibit performing such marriages to prohibit
recognizing them as well.3 Such constructions are striking in their
rejection of family law's strong presumption for the validity of
marriages44 and essentially strip interstate marriage recognition of all
meaning beyond cases in which a foreign marriage could have been
locally performed.
The courts that have denied these divorces are not unaware of
their rulings' potential to leave same-sex couples without any
mechanism for dissolving their relationships.46 Some have suggested
that these couples ought to be able to void these marriages as a
substitute for divorce.47 Yet with a migratory marriage, voidness
doctrine cannot substitute for divorce. Voidness entails a finding that
the marriage was void from the outset-a legal nullity from its
inception. 48 Such a finding is improper for the same-sex marriages at
42 Indeed, Rhode Island has no statute that expressly prohibits performing (much less
recognizing) same-sex marriages, although prevailing legal interpretations of its marriage
statutes do not permit performing them. See Letter from Rhode Island Attorney General
Patrick C. Lynch to Jack R. Warner, Commissioner, Rhode Island Board of Governors for
Higher Education *5 (Feb 20, 2007), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions
/2010/Warner.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2011). By contrast, Texas has a constitutional amendment and
statutory language banning same-sex marriage, see note 6, and both Indiana and Pennsylvania
have laws explicitly barring recognition of same-sex marriages, see Ind Code Ann § 31-11-1-1(b);
23 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1704.
43 See, for example, May, 114 NE2d at 7 ("[H]ad the Legislature been so disposed it could
have declared by appropriate enactment that marriages contracted in another State-which if
entered into here would be void-shall have no force in this State.").
44 See, for example, 36 Am Jur 2d, Proof of Facts 441 § 8 ("Once a marriage has been
shown to exist, it is presumed to be a legal and valid marriage .... This presumption has been
variously described by the courts as strong, very strong, extremely strong, and one of the
strongest known to the law.").
45 Connecticut also refused to give any effect to civil unions before its legislature passed a
civil unions bill, and even then would not recognize same-sex marriages. See Rosengarten v
Downes, 802 A2d 170, 178-84 (Conn App 2002) (noting "strong legislative policy against
permitting same sex marriages," and holding that a Vermont civil union was not a "family
relations matter" giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction for dissolution); Lane v Albanese,
39 Conn L Rptr 3, 4-5 (Conn Super Ct 2005) (adopting rationale in Rosengarten and holding
that a Massachusetts marriage was not a "family relations matter" as needed to give rise to
subject matter jurisdiction for dissolution). Both of these decisions have since been overruled by
Kerrigan v Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A2d 407,481-82 (Conn 2008).
46 See Chambers, 935 A2d at 966-67 (noting the "palpable hardship" that its decision might
work but arguing that it is bound by a "fundamental principle of jurisprudence" and judicial
restraint). Chambers left open the possibility that a court of general, and not statutory,
jurisdiction might exercise its equitable powers to grant the divorce. One of the parties, however,
later represented to the lower court on remand that she would return to Massachusetts and seek
dissolution there. See Edward Fitzpatrick, Judge Puts Off Same-Sex Divorce Ruling, Providence
J-Bull Local 1 (May 9,2008).
47 JB.,326 SW3d at 667; Kern,11 PaD & C 5th at 573.
48 .B., 326 SW3d at 667 ("A decree of voidness ... establishes that the parties to the
ostensible but void marriage were never married.").
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issue here, which were validly performed in the state of celebration;
indeed, the couple may have been validly married in their home state
for years before they even conceived of entering a hostile state. While
a hostile state court might validly apply its own law to void an evasive
marriage of its own domiciliaries, applying its own law retroactively to
void a migratory marriage raises considerable constitutional
concerns.49 In so doing, the hostile state is essentially announcing that
its own substantive law should have governed a controversy to which,
at the time, it may have had no connection whatsoever.
As a practical matter, voiding such marriages also undermines
reliance that may have developed on the marriage prior to its entering
the hostile state (by the spouses as well as by third parties such as
creditors); any interest one party may have developed in community
property while they were validly married in a community-property
state, for example, might be extinguished.so As one court recognized,
retroactively invalidating marriages would "disrupt thousands of
actions taken ... by [] same-sex couples, their employers, their
creditors, and many others, throwing property rights into disarray,
destroying the legal interests and expectations of ... couples and their
families, and potentially undermining the ability of citizens to plan
their lives."" And, of course, it continues to leave the parties with a
difficult road ahead for untangling any joint legal interests
independent of the marriage, such as property and children.
Thus, the hostility of a number of states to same-sex
relationships leaves many couples without the ability to obtain
divorces where they live.
49 See Strauss v Horton, 207 P3d 48, 122 (Cal 2009); Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The
States' Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens, 55 U Miami L Rev 1, 18 (2000) (noting
concerns based on the constitutional right to travel); Mark Strasser, For Whom the Bell Tolls: On
Subsequent Domiciles' Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U Cin L Rev 339, 375-80
(1998). By contrast, if, as in an evasive marriage, the individuals were already domiciled in the
hostile state, a far more convincing case is available that the hostile state has an exclusive interest
over the parties and that, therefore, its law should apply to void the marriage. See note 31.
50 Such a result would be particularly unfair given that couples are currently being forced
to deal with the tax implications of community property on a yearly basis rather than at the time
of dissolution. See Internal Revenue Service, Publication No 555, Community Property *2-8
(Dec 2010), online at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p555.pdf (visited Sept 1, 2011). Such a
practice is consistent only with the notion that the community property will retain its community
character even if the couple relocates to or divorces in a noncommunity-property state, as is
typically the case.
Of course, if a voidness declaration were limited to the period during which the parties were
domiciled in Texas, both these pragmatic and constitutional concerns might be assuaged. J.B.,
however, expressly rejects such a limitation. 326 SW3d at 679. If such a proceeding left
unresolved the consequences of the marriage as it existed in the migratory state, similar
problems would remain.
51 Strauss, 207 P3d at 122.
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II. THE SECOND BARRIER TO SAME-SEX DIVORCE:
THE DOMICILE RULE
That migratory same-sex couples cannot obtain divorces in their
home states would not be a significant problem if they were able to
return to their former residences-the states in which they celebrated
their marriages-to obtain divorces. This Part looks at the barriers
that currently prevent them from doing so.
The immediate barrier to same-sex couples' ability to obtain
divorces outside their home states is statutes requiring, as a
jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a divorce action, that one of the
parties meets a residence or domicile requirement. But these statutes
reflect a more substantial barrier: the Supreme Court's suggestion that
domicile is a constitutional prerequisite for a state to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a divorce action. 2 Such a requirement is a marked
deviation from the rules that would govern personal jurisdiction for
other actions, in which the parties' consent or even transient presence
in the forum state would suffice to confer personal jurisdiction."
The most prominent articulation of this constitutional
requirement was in Williams v North Carolina (Williams II), a case
that came before the Court twice in the 1940s54 and was one of many
mid-twentieth century cases the Court decided dealing with problems
of domestic relations in the federal system." Defendants O.B. Williams
and Lillie Shaver Hendrix left their spouses and escaped to Nevada,
where, after a short while, they obtained ex parte divorces from their
spouses and married each other, subsequently returning to North
Carolina. Unamused by this evasion of its restrictive divorce laws,
North Carolina refused to recognize the Nevada divorces and
successfully prosecuted Williams and Hendrix for "bigamous
cohabitation"; they appealed their convictions.
In its first pronouncement on the case, the Court held definitively
that any state in which either spouse is domiciled has jurisdiction over
a divorce action." That is, to the extent that Williams and Hendrix
were properly domiciled in Nevada, such a finding constituted
52 See Williams 11, 325 US at 229-30.
53 See notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
54 See Williams II, 325 US at 227 (summarizing the case and noting that the court had
visited the controversy in Williams v North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 US 287 (1942)).
ss Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 Wm &
Mary Bill Rts J 381, 382 & n 6 (2008).
56 Williams 1,317 US at 289-91.
57 Id at 298-99. This holding reversed prior jurisprudence suggesting the existence of a
"marital domicile" as the place where such an action ought to be entertained. See id.
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sufficient personal jurisdiction for Nevada courts to properly entertain
their divorce actions, even if the other spouses were absent.
But, in ruling as it did, the Court had assumed that the finding of
domicile in Nevada was correct." In its second pronouncement on the
case, however, the Court addressed this question, as North Carolina
had taken the opportunity on remand to introduce evidence
undermining Nevada's finding of domicile-leading a jury to
determine that Williams and Hendrix had not properly obtained
domicile in Nevada.59 The Court held that the bases of the Nevada
court's jurisdictional finding were subject to collateral attack and new
factual findings in North Carolina, because North Carolina should not
be bound by "an unfounded, even if not collusive, recital in the record
of a court of another State.",o It therefore upheld North Carolina's
determination that no such domicile existed."
In reaching its second holding, however, the Court also took the
opportunity to generalize about the prerequisites for a divorce action,
beyond the specific jurisdictional prerequisites at issue (Nevada's
domicile requirement): "Under our system of law, judicial power to
grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on
domicil.... Domicil implies a nexus between person and place of such
permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and
responsibilities of the utmost significance."62 The Court claimed that
such a domicile requirement had been in place-and unquestioned-
since the writing of the Constitution.
The extent to which this language from Williams II actually spells
out a rule requiring domicile for a finding of personal jurisdiction in a
divorce action is not entirely clear." Justice Felix Frankfurter's broad
58 Id at 302 ("[W]e repeat that in this case we must assume that petitioners had a bona fide
domicil in Nevada, not that the Nevada domicil was a sham."). Note that, as is often the case in
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the question of whether the divorce action was founded on
sufficient personal jurisdiction arose here in the context of whether the divorce decree was entitled
to full faith and credit in another state. Among other things, this highlights the fact that even if
neither party to a divorce action contests personal jurisdiction in the original action, the holding
remains vulnerable if there is reason to question the personal jurisdiction of the original court.
59 Williams I, 325 US at 235-36.
60 Id at 230-32.
61 Id at 235-37.
62 Id at 229, citing Bell v Bell, 181 US 175 (1901) and Andrews v Andrews, 188 US 14
(1903). The Court later reiterated that "one State can grant a divorce of validity in other States
only if the applicant has a bona fide domicil in the State of the court purporting to dissolve a
prior legal marriage." Williams 11, 325 US at 238.
63 Williams 11, 325 US at 229.
64 Some may question whether the domicile rule is, in fact, a rule of personal jurisdiction at
all and not a rule of subject matter jurisdiction (which it may in many ways resemble). In the era
of long-arm personal jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction via consent, the domicile rule is,
indeed, an anomalous rule of personal jurisdiction. See Part IV.A.2.a. But federal subject matter
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pronouncement on domicile and personal jurisdiction has often been
regarded as dicta." The legal question at issue was North Carolina's
ability to collaterally attack Nevada's factual finding that the parties
were domiciled in Nevada, at least when the defending spouse was
absent." The Court's holding that North Carolina was entitled to
relitigate this issue was therefore sufficient to resolve the case." The
court did not need to reach the sweeping question of whether only
domicile would suffice to confer personal jurisdiction over a divorce
action-particularly when (unlike in Williams II) the defending party
actually appears in the action." And since Williams II, the Court has
never squarely decided a divorce case in which personal jurisdiction
was founded on any basis other than domicile." Commentators- and
some courts-have suggested that this leaves open whether a
jurisdiction limits only the types of questions that the federal courts may hear; state courts of
general jurisdiction have plenary subject matter jurisdiction over questions arising under the
laws of other states and federal law, as long as they meet state law requirements. See Tafflin v
Levitt, 493 US 455,458-59 (1990); Hughes v Fetter, 341 US 609,612-14 (1951); Fleming James Jr,
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr, and John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure § 2.22 at 125 (Foundation 5th ed
2001) ("Subject to [personal jurisdiction] limitations, each state is free to organize its own court
system and to prescribe rules of jurisdiction and venue governing them.").
Thus, the constructs of personal jurisdiction provide the only available theoretical
framework for considering the domicile rule as a jurisdictional requirement. See Shaffer v
Heitner, 433 US 186, 212 (1977) ("[A]ll assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."); James, Hazard, and
Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure § 2.7 at 85-86 (cited in note 64) (considering the domicile rule under
the heading of personal jurisdiction). And the role of the domicile rule as a rule of personal
jurisdiction is apparent when one considers its effect in an ex parte divorce, in which it permits
bringing a suit in a state where one spouse is domiciled even though the other spouse may not
have any other connection that would otherwise give rise to personal jurisdiction. See Williams I,
317 US at 288-89.
65 See Homer H. Clark Jr, 1 The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 724 (West
2d ed 1987); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflicts of Laws 238 (West 1962); Helen
Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era, 58 Tex L Rev 501, 502
(1980).
66 See Williams 11, 325 US at 230 & n 6.
67 Read charitably, the Court's decision might be seen as depending upon a finding that
Williams and Hendrix's brief stay in "an auto-court for transients" was insufficient to grant
Nevada jurisdiction over the divorce, at least when their spouses (who had been constructively
served) had not appeared to contest the divorce. See id at 230-31,236-37. Such a holding, however,
still falls short of the domicile rule's application to divorces in which both spouses appear.
68 The Court acknowledged as much in Williams I. See 317 US at 302 ("We thus have no
question on the present record whether a divorce decree granted by the courts of one state to a
resident as distinguished from a domiciliary is entitled to full faith and credit in another state.").
69 See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 72, Reporter's Note (1971) ("The
Supreme Court of the United States has never had occasion to determine whether the domicil of
at least one spouse in the divorce State is an essential jurisdictional basis for the granting of a
divorce."). In the one action where the Court entertained such a case, it avoided the personal
jurisdiction question by finding the divorce statute invalid on other grounds. See note 77.
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jurisdictional basis other than domicile is sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction."
Deviations from the domicile rule have become a practical reality
given the inherent difficulties in the concept of domicile (which
generally requires intent to stay), as opposed to mere residence. Thus,
in a few states, divorce statutes rely on residence for a particular
amount of time, and not domicile, as the jurisdictional prerequisite for
divorce." The domicile rule has also been relaxed in certain limited
and extenuating circumstances (for example, with regard to soldiers
stationed away from home).7
And while the domicile rule expounded in Williams II has not
been explicitly overturned, the Court has severely circumscribed its
practical effect, suggesting some level of discomfort with its
consequences. The Court, in subsequent cases, significantly limited
collateral attacks on the findings of domicile: first by preventing
parties to a divorce from collaterally attacking the original court's
jurisdiction (whether or not they exercised that opportunity)" and,
second, by holding that even third parties are collaterally estopped
from contesting the basis for the court's jurisdiction." Together, these
cases have expanded the security of domicile findings in divorce
actions beyond the normal rules of collateral estoppel, and have
"effectively limited the relitigation rule to ex parte divorces.""
Relatedly, the Court has limited the scope of actions that are actually
subject to the domicile rule by dividing the dissolution of marital
status from subsequent questions, such as matrimonial support,
property, and child custody (for which in personam jurisdiction is
necessary and sufficient to confer jurisdiction over actions).
70 See, for example, David-Zieseniss v Zieseniss, 129 NYS2d 649, 653-54 (NY S Ct 1954)
(declining to follow Williams II as "too loose" an utterance); Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev
at 12-24, 52 (cited in note 10). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 72
(adopting a rule contrary to Williams II).
Commentators often note that the sweeping historical assertions underlying the Williams II
language has been amply undermined. See, for example, Ehrenzweig, Conflicts of Laws at 238-40
(cited in note 65). But see Alton v Alton, 207 F2d 667, 673-74 (3d Cir 1953), vacd as moot,
347 US 610 (1954) (rejecting the idea that Williams II is not binding). For further discussion of
Alton, see text accompanying notes 77-83.
71 See, for example, Wheat v Wheat, 318 SW2d 793,794 (Ark 1958) ("The effect of the 1957
statute is to substitute residence, in the sense of physical presence, for domicile as a jurisdictional
requirement in divorce cases."). See also Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 21-24 (cited in
note 10). But see note 89 and accompanying text.
72 See Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 20-21 (cited in note 10).
73 See Sherrer v Sherrer, 334 US 343,351-52 (1948); Coe v Coe, 334 US 378,383-84 (1948).
74 Johnson v Muelberger, 340 US 581, 587-89 (1951).
75 Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 508 (cited in note 65).
76 See id at 510-12; Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 Harv L Rev 1233,1237-40 (1963).
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Despite these limits on the applicability of Williams II, at least
one circuit court has held that attempts to base jurisdiction for a
divorce action on something other than domicile would be per se
unconstitutional. In Alton v Alton," the Third Circuit confronted a
Virgin Islands statute requiring only six weeks' inhabitance to
entertain a divorce action-a requirement not even intended as prima
facie evidence of domicile but rather as the only jurisdictional
prerequisite to obtain a divorce." The Alton court held that not only
did the District Court of the Virgin Islands not have jurisdiction to
entertain such a divorce action, but that the mere granting of such a
divorce not founded on domicile was itself unconstitutional: "[A] state
where the party is not domiciled is, in rendering him a divorce,
attempting to create an interest where it has no jurisdiction. Its attempt
to do so is an invalid attempt, and contrary to the due process clause."'9
In so holding, the Alton court extended beyond the reach of
Williams II. First, it treated as binding the language from Williams II,
which it might have dismissed as dicta.so It thus confronted the
question that the Supreme Court has yet to squarely address: whether
Williams II bars all divorce decrees when domicile is not the
jurisdictional basis for the action."' Second, the Alton court did not
simply hold, as the Williams II Court had with the Nevada decree, that
other states were entitled to ignore (that is, refuse full faith and credit
to) the Virgin Islands decree.8 Rather, it took the question as one of
77 207 F2d 667 (3d Cir 1953), vacd as moot, 347 US 610 (US 1954). Alton was vacated as
moot when the parties, whose Virgin Islands divorce formed the basis of the dispute,
subsequently obtained a divorce in Connecticut. See 347 US at 610. However, the Third Circuit
deferred entirely to the reasoning in Alton and struck down the Virgin Islands statute once again
in Granville-Smith v Granville-Smith, 214 F2d 820,820 (3d Cir 1954) (en banc) (per curiam). The
Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, allowing it to evade the due process concerns
raised in Alton. See Granville-Smith v Granville-Smith, 349 US 1, 4 (1955) (noting the "obvious
importance of the issue which brought the Alton case here" but holding that "[wie need not
consider any of the substantive questions passed on below" and striking down the Virgin Islands
statute as beyond the congressional grant of authority to the Virgin Islands legislature).
Though technically Granville-Smith is the precedential holding, courts and commentators
have referred to the legal principles by reference to the Alton decision (a practice adopted here).
See, for example, Wheat, 318 SW2d at 796 (noting that Alton was dismissed as moot but using it
as the basis for the court's due process analysis); Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 48 (cited
in note 10).
78 Alton, 207 F2d at 669-70. Compare this with the statute currently in place in Arkansas,
which renders three months' presence before entry of the judgment prima facie evidence of
domicile. Ark Code Ann § 9-12-307. See also Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 21-24 (cited
in note 10).
79 Alton, 207 F2d at 676.
s0 See id (noting the "unequivocal language" language in Williams II).
81 See id at 674 ("We now go out beyond the place where legal trails end.").
82 The issue of personal jurisdiction in Alton did not appear as the same legal question as it
had in Williams II: whether the divorce decree was entitled to full faith and credit. See note 58.
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due process, thus implicating the validity of the Virgin Islands divorce
decree itself, a question that simply had not arisen in Williams I.3 In
so doing, it created the possibility of offensive uses of the Williams II
rule by parties seeking to affirmatively invalidate divorce decrees as
violative of due process. These twin aspects of the Alton holding cast a
considerable shadow over any attempt to expand the jurisdictional
bases of divorce beyond domicile.
Consistent with the Alton holding, courts and commentators have
continued to treat the domicile rule expounded in Williams II as
binding precedent. In 1975, the Court, in Sosna v Iowa," affirmed the
Williams II principle. In Sosna, Iowa's statute requiring one year of
domicile in the state in order to obtain a divorce was challenged on
right-to-travel and due process grounds." In upholding the statute, the
Court enumerated, as a justification for the residence requirement,
Iowa's interest in ensuring that any divorce decree entered there was
founded on a sufficient jurisdictional finding so as to entitle it to full
faith and credit in another state." In so doing, the Court stated as a
rule the Williams II holding that the jurisdictional basis for divorce
could not be anything other than domicile."
And while the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue since
Sosna, state courts-paying continued respect to the holding in
Williams II-have rejected as unconstitutional statutes basing
personal jurisdiction for divorce on residence or some basis other than
domicile - or construed such statutes to conform to Williams II's
Rather the issue was the ability of the Virgin Islands court to grant the decree to begin with.
Thus, exactly replicating the Williams II holding was not an option for the Alton court.
83 Alton, 207 F2d at 677 ("[W]e believe it to be lack of due process for one state to take to
itself the readjustment of domestic relations between those domiciled elsewhere.").
8 If nothing else, state legislatures may be understandably reticent to expand the
jurisdictional bases of divorce beyond those permitted in Alton, given that any misstep might
result in the invalidation of numerous divorces. Such legislatures would also potentially face the
added hurdle of determining choice-of-law rules to apply to such nondomiciliary divorces and
applying foreign law. See Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 38-39 (cited in note 10).
85 419 US 393 (1975).
86 See id at 405. While the statute itself required only one year of residence, it also required
that "the maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the purpose of
obtaining a marriage dissolution only." Id at 395 n 1, quoting Iowa Code § 598.6 (1973), repealed
by Act of April 28,2005 § 58,2005 Iowa Acts ch 69. As the Court noted, by requiring some intent
to be present other than obtaining the dissolution, "the Iowa courts have construed the term
'resident' to have much the same meaning as is ordinarily associated with the concept of
domicile." Sosna, 419 US at 404, citing Korsrud v Korsrud, 45 NW2d 848 (Iowa 1951).
87 Sosna, 419 US at 407-09 (noting Iowa's interest in being "convinced that [a party]
intends to remain in the State").
88 See id at 407, citing Williams 11, 325 US at 229. Of course, as the dissent rightly pointed
out, nothing inherent in the concept of domicile requires a stay of a particular length. See Sosna,
419 US at 424-25 (Marshall dissenting).
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domicile requirement.' Numerous commentators also continue to
note the viability of this doctrine.o For these reasons, a significant
constitutional hurdle stands in the way of any attempt to expand
divorce jurisdiction to permit divorces in the state of celebration of a
same-sex marriage or civil union.
III. LOOKING FOR A FORUM IN THE STATE OF CELEBRATION
If same-sex couples in hostile states are to gain access to divorce,
one of these two barriers must fall: either hostile states must begin
providing divorces for same-sex couples, or friendly states must find a
way to begin granting them divorces. This Part describes why a
solution in the friendly states is the more pragmatic answer to this
problem and describes the important features of state statutes
providing a forum for the dissolution of same-sex civil unions and
marriages in the state of celebration.
A. Why Not Focus on Hostile States?
So far, the attention of courts and commentators addressing
dissolution of same-sex marriages and civil unions has been focused
entirely on undoing the first barrier to the availability of these
divorces-that is, on improving the situation in states that do not
recognize or perform same-sex marriages." Some courts have already
held that hostile states' refusal to permit same-sex couples to marry
(or at least access the benefits of marriage) violates equal protection
or due process, and some state legislatures have similarly acted to
afford same-sex couples either marriage or civil unions.92 With these
changes, the ability to divorce flows as a legal consequence. Courts
and commentators have also argued that comity, equal protection, or
due process requires that hostile states at least recognize out-of-state
same-sex marriages, even if they do not perform them." The literature
89 See, for example, Viernes v District Court, 509 P2d 306,310 (Colo 1973) (en banc), citing
Williams II, 325 US 226. See also Padron v Padron, 641 SE2d 542, 543 (Ga 2007); Fletcher v
Fletcher, 619 A2d 561, 565-66 (Md App 1993); In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 NW2d 869, 873-76
(Iowa 1991); Carr v Carr, 385 NE2d 1234, 1236 (NY 1978); Whitehead v Whitehead, 492 P2d 939,
942-43 (Hawaii 1972).
90 See, for example, Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 508 (cited in note 65) ("Williams II is still the
law today."). Even those who do advocate departing from the domicile rule in favor of residence
do not believe the constitutional requirements could be necessarily loosened beyond that. See,
for example, Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers, and Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws 695-98,
707-08 (West 5th ed 2010).
91 See sources cited in note 94.
92 See notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
93 See authorities cited in note 35. See also, for example, Koppelman, Same Sex, Different
States at 69-81 (cited in note 26).
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that addresses same-sex divorce uses the same doctrines in support of
a more limited proposition: that hostile states should at least recognize
these marriages for the purpose of dissolving them, even if they will
not perform same-sex marriages or recognize them for all purposes.
While many of these arguments are cogent and compelling, the
reality is that these claims are unlikely to provide a remedy for same-
sex couples in the near future. Though some states have moved
legislatively to allow same-sex couples access to marriage or civil
unions, such movement continues to proceed slowly (if steadily).
Achieving even limited recognition of migratory marriages in hostile
states has proven exceptionally difficult," perhaps because courts fear
that such limited recognition will lead to full marriage equality.
Nonrecognition is encouraged, and perhaps required, by state
constitutional and statutory enactments banning same-sex marriage.9
To the extent these constitutional enactments require popular
majorities to overturn them, progress may take a significant amount of
time." Federal law also encourages (though does not mandate)
nonrecognition." Ultimately, progress for same-sex divorce in many
hostile states seems unlikely to gain significant traction until the equal
protection and due process claims in favor of same-sex marriage gain
more widespread purchase. Absent a dispositive ruling from the
Supreme Court or a rapid shift in public opinion, the situation in
hostile states is not likely to change soon, even if the number of
hostile states looks likely to decrease somewhat.
And in the meantime, the number of same-sex marriages
performed in the United States continues to grow; by 2010, an
estimated fifty thousand same-sex couples had obtained marriages
within the United States, with an additional eighty-five thousand
94 See Ramais, Note, 2010 U Ill L Rev at 1038-43 (cited in note 17) (arguing that due
process considerations mandate that states such as Rhode Island grant same-sex divorces);
Danielle Johnson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A Critical Analysis of Chambers v.
Ormiston and Why Divorce Is an Incident of Marriage That Should be Uniformly Recognized
throughout the States, 50 Santa Clara L Rev 225, 252-54 (2010) (arguing that courts should
evaluate the particular incident of marriage at issue and recognize marriages for the purpose of
divorce); Louis Thorson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce and Wisconsin Courts: Imperfect
Harmony?, 92 Marq L Rev 617, 646-48 (2009) (arguing that Wisconsin could entertain a same-
sex divorce action and grant a divorce). See also J.B., 326 SW3d at 677 (recognizing the
independent equal protection concern at issue in the denial of divorce).
95 See notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
96 See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv L Rev 1026,
1071 (2003).
97 See notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
98 See Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and
Policy Responsiveness, 103 Am Polit Sci Rev 367,373 (2009) (showing that in many states, same-
sex marriage enjoys far less than majority support).
99 See note 25.
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couples having obtained civil unions.w No evidence suggests that these
couples are significantly less (or more) likely to divorce than
different-sex couples.'o
But the approach advocated in this Comment does not require
waiting for hostile states to change their policies, for public opinion in
these states to move toward popular acceptance of same-sex marriage,
or for the equal protection and due process claims of same-sex
couples to gain further traction in the courts. Instead, it can be
accomplished now and in states that have perhaps already
demonstrated some receptivity to the equality and rights claims of
same-sex couples by providing them access to marriage or civil unions
in the first place.
B. Features of the State-of-Celebration Solution
Statutes permitting divorce in the state of celebration are not
unprecedented. From 1862 until at least 1954, New York law provided
for the dissolution of marriages on adultery grounds, regardless of the
domicile of the parties, when the marriage had been celebrated in
New York.02 While some New York courts applied a narrowing
construction of this statute and refused to apply it to out-of-state
domiciliaries,'o3 at least a few did apply it to out-of-state domiciliaries,
and at least one did so with full knowledge of the Third Circuit's result
in Alton." And some commentators have suggested adopting divorce
in the place of celebration as part of a more general loosening of the
domicile rule.'0 '
Four states-California, Delaware, Illinois, and Oregon-have
recently passed state-of-celebration dissolution statutes as part of
their civil union laws. Couples who obtain civil unions in one of these
states may dissolve them in that state, even if neither party can claim
domicile there at the time of dissolution. Such statutes may be seen as
100 See Williams Institute, Press Release, Williams Institute Experts Comment on
Department of Justice DOMA Decision *1 (Feb 24, 2011), online at http://www2.law.ucla.edu
/williamsinstitute/pdf/Pressrelease2.24.pdf (visited Sept 2,2011).
101 See Gary J. Gates, M.V. Lee Badgett, and Deborah Ho, Marriage Registration, and
Dissolution by Same-Sex Couples in the US. *16 (Williams Institute July 2008), online at
http://www3.law.ucla.edulwilliamsinstitute/publications/Couples%20Marr%20Regis%2Diss.pdf
(visited Sept 2,2011).
102 See David-Zieseniss v Zieseniss, 129 NYS2d 649, 651-52 (NY S Ct 1954) (reviewing
history of the statute).
103 See Huneker v Huneker, 57 NYS2d 99, 100 (NY S Ct 1945) (collecting cases). See also
Gray v Gray, 38 NE (98 Sickles) 301, 302 (NY 1894) (assuming the limitation to domiciliaries).
104 See David-Zieseniss, 129 NYS2d at 651,654-58 (collecting New York cases granting such
divorces and distinguishing Alton in order to grant a divorce to out-of-state domiciliaries).
105 See Part IV.A.2.b.
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having three parts: a consent provision, a jurisdictional provision, and
a choice-of-law provision, each of which will be discussed in turn.
The consent provisions render entry into a civil union an act of
either express or implied consent (depending on the particular
statute) to that state's jurisdiction over the divorce. The consent
provision in Illinois's civil union law, for example, provides, "Any
person who enters into a civil union in Illinois consents to the
jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois for the purpose of any action
relating to a civil union even if one or both parties cease to reside in
this State."'" This implied consent provision differs from those in
California"o and Oregon,'o which appear as part of contract-like
agreements-Declarations of Domestic Partnership-that couples
actually sign and notarize.10 For example, Oregon's provision requires
that
[o]n the Declaration of Domestic Partnership, each individual
who wants to become a partner in a domestic partnership shall
... [s]tate that the individual consents to the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts of Oregon for the purpose of an action to obtain a
judgment of dissolution or annulment of the domestic
partnership ... even if one or both partners cease to reside in, or
to maintain a domicile in, this state."'
Illinois's and Delaware's civil union laws are procedurally more
marriage-like in this respect, because, as with marriages, there is no
such literal contractual agreement: couples fill out an application
containing basic information, pay a fee, and then receive a license and
certificate."'
The jurisdictional provisions actually confer subject matter
jurisdiction on state courts to dissolve these unions. In California, for
example, the statute plainly states that "[t]he superior courts shall
have jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to the dissolution of
domestic partnerships.... [E]ven if neither domestic partner is a
resident of, or maintains a domicile in, the state at the time the
proceedings are filed.""2 Similar explicit language appears in the
106 750 ILCS § 75/45.See also Act of May 11,2011,78 Del Laws ch 22 (effective Jan 1,2012),
codified at 13 Del Code Ann § 216
107 Cal Fam Code § 298(c)(3).
1os Or Rev Stat § 106.325(5).
109 Cal Fam Code H 298(a)(1),298.5(a);Or Rev Stat § 106.325(1).
110 Or Rev Stat § 106.325(5).
111 Compare, for example, 750 ILCS § 75/30, with 750 ILCS §§ 5/202, 5/203 (laying out
identical application and licensing procedures for marriages and civil unions). See also 13 Del
Code §§ 207-09.
112 Cal Fam Code § 299.
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Delaware civil union law."3 The Illinois and Oregon provisions contain
conferrals of jurisdiction that operate in a less straightforward
114
manner.
Finally, the choice-of-law provisions dictate the substantive law
that should govern the dissolution of civil unions performed in the
state of celebration."' In Illinois, for example, the civil union law holds
that the statutes governing dissolutions of marriages "shall apply to a
dissolution of a civil union.""6 Though this serves the larger purpose of
creating parity between civil unions and marriages by requiring the
same procedures to dissolve them, it also functions as a choice-of-law
rule by mandating that Illinois dissolution law will govern all civil
union dissolutions in Illinois, even those brought by couples living out
of state. Similar provisions exist in California and Delaware,"' and the
same result may be implied in the Oregon statute."
It is important to note, however, that some of the laws outlined
here may permit divorces beyond the scope of the defense outlined in
Part IV The California, Delaware, and Oregon statutes may apply to
"evasive" unions obtained by couples who have left their home state
for the sole purpose of contracting a civil union (for example, an
Idaho couple who visits Los Angeles, obtains a domestic partnership,
and then returns home), which a domiciliary state may validly void."'
And the California, Illinois, and Oregon statutes apply regardless of
whether the couple is able to seek divorce in their home state, thus
113 13 Del Code Ann § 216. Note that in Delaware, this exercise of jurisdiction is limited if
either party to the civil union may obtain a dissolution elsewhere. See note 122 and
accompanying text.
114 In Oregon, the provision allows for filing of divorce actions even though a couple might
not meet the state's residence requirement. See Or Rev Stat § 106.325(4). In Illinois, courts are
directed to dissolve civil unions whenever the grounds for dissolution of a marriage, set forth in
750 ILCS § 5/401(a)(1)-(2), are present. 750 ILCS § 75/45. By requiring only that the grounds for
dissolution be present, the residency requirement found elsewhere in the marriage dissolution
statute, 750 ILCS § 5/401 (a), is bypassed as a requirement for civil union dissolutions.
115 The significance of these laws as dictating choice of law is discussed further in Part IV.B.
Nothing in these laws suggests that they would serve as extraterritorial choice-of-law clauses
(that is, that they would require a court in another state dissolving a civil union to apply state-of-
celebration law).
116 750 ILCS § 75/45. See also 750 ILCS § 75/50.
117 Cal Fam Code § 299; 13 Del Code Ann § 216.
118 The Oregon statute does not explicitly single out civil union dissolution procedures as
needing to follow the same procedures as Oregon marriage dissolutions, but does generally require
parity between civil unions and marriages in all respects. Or Rev Stat § 106.340(1)-(2), (4).
119 See note 31 and accompanying text. The justifications for states of celebration to
exercise jurisdiction are less compelling when the couples did not live there or when such an
alternative mechanism is available. See Parts IVA.3-5.
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eliminating a number of rationales that support the granting of state-
of-celebration divorces.'20
Some of these statutes, however, contain provisions that limit
their applicability. The Illinois statute, for example, forbids performing
evasive civil unions (that is, those that could not be obtained in the
couples' home state).12' And the Delaware statute limits its jurisdiction
over nondomiciliary dissolutions to those instances in which "the
jurisdiction of domicile or residency of the petitioner and/or the
respondent does not by law affirmatively permit such a proceeding to
be brought in the courts of that jurisdiction."22 These provisions more
narrowly tailor state of celebration divorce statutes to dissolutions for
which a state of celebration has a stronger case to exercise personal
jurisdiction.
IV. RECONCILING STATE-OF-CELEBRATION DIVORCES WITH THE
DOMICILE RULE
The domicile rule presents a significant hurdle for any divorce
granted in the state of celebration, such as the ones permitted in
California, Delaware, Illinois, and Oregon, because it calls into
question whether any such decrees are founded on sufficient personal
jurisdiction. Under the strict domicile requirement Williams II
expounds, such decrees would not be entitled to full faith and credit in
another state.12 And under Alton, such divorces would inherently
violate the Due Process Clause.124
The problems that the domicile rule creates are not solely
academic. For every state-of-celebration divorce, there is a party with
the ability-and, often, the incentive-to challenge the court's
personal jurisdiction based on the domicile rule. First, not all same-sex
divorces are achieved by mutual consent; thus one spouse might find it
significantly advantageous to contest personal jurisdiction in the state
of celebration in order to avoid the consequences of the dissolution
(including sharing custody or paying spousal maintenance).' If he can
120 The rationales of Parts IV.A.3.a-b, IV.A.4.a, and IV.B, in particular, would likely not
apply to same-sex couples who are able to divorce in their home state or whose inability to
divorce is the result of some other factor than the hostile state's refusal to recognize their
marriage. In addition, permitting such couples a forum for dissolution in the state of celebration
might create an incentive to forum shop (assuming-as has traditionally been the case-the
domiciliary state will apply its own law, see note 197 and accompanying text).
121 See 750 ILCS § 75/35(a). See also 750 ILCS § 5/217 (prohibiting marriages so obtained).
122 13 Del Code Ann § 216.
123 325 US at 229-35.
124 207 F2d at 676-77.
125 These custody or maintenance consequences seem likely to flow from a dissolution in a
friendly state, because the choice-of-law provisions generally provide that all of the procedures
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successfully avoid the foreign forum, a spouse may be able to
completely evade any consequences from the marriage ever having
existed.' Second, the couple's state of residence itself might also be
able to contest the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the state of
celebration, either by intervening in the original action or by
intervening in (or perhaps even commencing) a subsequent action-
like the one in Williams II-that permits collateral attacks to
invalidate the prior decree (such as an action brought by one spouse
to enforce the state-of-celebration dissolution in the hostile state).'27
This eventuality is made more plausible by the apparent eagerness of
certain state attorneys general to intervene to prevent same-sex
divorces.1' Finally, even if no party contests the jurisdiction, it is
nevertheless possible that a court might raise this issue itself, as the
Alton court did.'"
This Part argues that state-of-celebration divorce actions should
survive any challenge based on the assertion that they constitute an
unjustified deviation from the domicile rule. Part IV.A examines two
state interests that might justify applying the domicile rule as a rule of
that would attend a normal divorce should apply to these dissolutions-including any ancillary
issues such as children or property (though the court would need to assure itself of adequate
personal jurisdiction in order to issue any such rulings). See notes 116-18 and accompanying
text. (Though a more full discussion of the proper way to treat these downstream issues would
fill an important lacuna in the literature, it is unfortunately beyond the scope of this Comment.)
For one particularly prominent case of a party to a same-sex civil union seeking to use the law of
a hostile state in order to avoid sharing custody, see Miller-Jenkins v Miller-Jenkins,
637 SE2d 330, 332-33 (Va App 2006). One might also imagine a party using the mere threat of
contesting personal jurisdiction as a bargaining chip in divorce negotiations.
126 The ability to evade the obligations of the marriage stems from the fact that the hostile
state would likely not impose any such obligations flowing from the marriage. See, for example,
the sweeping language in JB., 326 SW3d at 666 ("[The Texas Constitution and Family Code]
forbid the State and its agencies from giving any effect whatsoever to a same-sex marriage.").
127 Although the Court's holdings in Sherrer, Coe, and Johnson limit the parties who may
collaterally attack the jurisdictional bases of a divorce decree, most commentators believe that
the couples' true state of domicile might retain that ability. See Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 508 &
n 43 (cited in note 65) (collecting authorities).
Consider also that the jurisdictional foundations of a divorce granted in the state of
celebration might be subject to collateral attacks (in subsequent proceedings) by additional third
parties, even though domiciliary divorces might not. This is because, just as Williams II may be
limited to divorce actions founded upon findings of domicile, so too may the holdings in Sherrer,
Coe, and Johnson limiting relitigation of jurisdiction. See Jeffrey S. Guilford, Guam Divorces:
Fast, Easy, and Dangerous, 1990 Army Law 20, 25-26 (Mar) (urging readers to remember that
the decision in Sherrer was predicated on the original court finding domicile, which leaves a
collateral attack on jurisdiction possible when jurisdiction for divorce is not founded on
domicile).
128 See notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
129 The divorce in Alton was not contested; as the Third Circuit opinion recounts, it was the
district court judge who demanded that the jurisdictional prerequisites be met. See 207 F2d
at 668 ("When the case came to the judge of the district court he asked for further proof on the
question of domicile.").
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personal jurisdiction: state interests in exclusively controlling marital
status, and state interests in exclusively controlling divorce. It argues
that-in the case of migratory same-sex marriages that the couples'
domiciliary state refuses to recognize-neither of these state interests
is sufficiently exclusive or persuasive to justify the domicile rule as a
bar to state-of-celebration divorces. Part IV.B then argues that
constitutional constraints on choice of law are also insufficient to
justify barring state-of-celebration divorces.
A. The Domicile Rule as a Rule of Personal Jurisdiction
The primary rationale that has been offered to support the
domicile rule as a rule of personal jurisdiction is that it protects
important state interests. While these interests might have been
compelling at the time of the adoption of the domicile rule and might
remain compelling in certain circumstances, this Part argues that such
interests are not offended by allowing same-sex couples to obtain
divorces in the state of celebration, at least when their domiciliary
state refuses to recognize their relationships.
1. State interests as justifying the domicile rule.
A state has a significant interest, derived from its status as a
sovereign, in controlling its land, its citizens, and in particular, "the
conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved."' The
Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has been one
mechanism for protecting these long-standing state interests within
the federal system. As "an instrument of interstate federalism," due
process may sometimes "divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment."' As the Court has recognized, protecting such state
interests as a matter of personal jurisdiction is a crucial part of the
federal system, because
the Framers [ ] intended that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign
power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State,
in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister
130 Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714,734-35 (1878). See also United States v Morrison, 529 US 598,
616 (2000) (situating "family law" as unquestionably within the exclusive sphere of state
sovereignty).
131 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286,294 (1980).
1608 [78:1585
Untangling the Knot
States-a limitation express or implicit in both the original
scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.132
The state's interest as a "third party" to a marriage has been
frequently described as justifying the unique burdens attached to
dissolving them (embodied in divorce).'3 Similarly, here, the states'
interests in controlling the domestic relations of their citizens have
been invoked by both courts and commentators as justifying the
holdings in Williams II and Alton.' In Williams II, the Court based its
domicile requirement on the fact that only domicile "implies a nexus
between person and place of such permanence as to control the
creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost
significance."3 . Noting that divorce "touches basic interests of society,"
it held that a state "concerned with the vindication of its social policy"
should not be bound by the "selfish action of those outside its
borders" who improperly obtain (or grant) divorces."' Alton also
reflects this understanding of the domicile rule. In granting a divorce
to Connecticut domiciliaries, the Alton court argued, the Virgin
Islands had improperly "readjust[ed] domestic relations between
those domiciled elsewhere."'. The court insisted that "adherence to
the domiciliary requirement is necessary if our states are really to
have control over the domestic relations of their citizens.,, 38
States' exclusive interests in regulating the domestic relations of
their citizens were particularly at risk in an era when states differed
greatly in the reasons for which-and the ease with which-couples
could obtain divorces. The court in Alton gave a paradigmatic example
of the differences in state laws that the domicile rule was designed to
protect: "In the Virgin Islands incompatibility of temperament
constitutes grounds for divorce. In Connecticut it does not."' The
concern was that couples would leave their home state and forum shop
for the state with the most advantageous divorce procedures, effectively
132 Id at 293.
133 See, for example, Gant v Gant, 329 SE2d 106, 114 (W Va 1985); Hempel v Hempel,
181 NW 749, 752 (Wis 1921).
134 See Williams II, 325 US at 230-32, 237-38; Alton, 207 F2d at 676-77; David-Zieseniss v
Zieseniss, 129 NYS2d 649,655 (NY Sup Ct 1954); Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 24-32 (cited
in note 10); Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 522 (cited in note 65); David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the
Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U Chi L Rev 26,45-46 (1966).
135 Williams 11, 325 US at 229.
136 Id at 230. See also Sosna, 419 US at 407 (describing the grant of a divorce to
domiciliaries of another state as "officious intermeddling in matters in which another State has a
paramount interest").
137 Alton, 207 F2d at 676-77.
138 Id at 676.
139 Id at 676-77.
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nullifying a domiciliary state's efforts to restrict or discourage divorce."
As one commentator put it, "[S]tates with strict divorce laws ... needed
exclusive power to grant their citizens divorces. If other states, with
more liberal divorce laws, could grant divorces to citizens domiciled in
the strict divorce state, then the strict divorce state would lose all ability
to regulate the status of its citizens."4'
The Alton court thus issued its due process ruling to prevent the
Virgin Islands' loose divorce policy from interfering with
Connecticut's more restrictive policy.' That is, the purpose of the
domicile rule was to allow each state to preserve its own substantive
divorce law, thus protecting, within the federal system, the "contrast
between states that denied divorce except on the most restrictive
grounds and those that granted it virtually on demand."4 . The domicile
rule provided a solution by limiting couples to obtaining divorce in
their domiciliary states, thus protecting that state's substantive divorce
policy.
2. Rejecting broader rationales for supplanting state interests.
The existing literature on the domicile rule suggests a number of
broader rationales for arguing that the domicile rule is no longer
justified, and, in particular, that the state interests that undergirded
Williams II and Alton have lost their ongoing salience. While these
rationales do offer reason to think that these state interests are not
quite as compelling as they once were, they are insufficient, for
reasons stated below, to justify the wholesale evisceration of the
domicile rule they would require.
a) Post-International Shoe personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction precedents since its
landmark decision in International Shoe v Washington'" govern
personal jurisdiction in nearly every other context.14 One might argue
that these rules of personal jurisdiction have simply superseded the
domicile rule. Under this view, post-International Shoe precedents
might be seen, in their loosening of the once strictly territorial rules
140 See Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 522-24 (cited in note 65).
141 Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 25-26 (cited in note 10).
142 Alton, 207 F3d at 677.
143 Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 524 (cited in note 65).
144 326 US 310 (1945).
145 Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186,212 (1977) ("We therefore conclude that all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny."). But see id at 209 n 30.
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governing personal jurisdiction, as shifting the balance between state
and individual interests toward the latter.
Such an approach is tempting because, in the controversies at
issue here, the modern rules of personal jurisdiction would likely
validate the state of celebration's power to issue a divorce decree.
When both parties to the action are willingly present, there is no
question that the state of celebration could properly exercise
jurisdiction (indeed, the fact that an individual merely passes through
a state is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction)."' And even if one
party were absent, the personal jurisdiction inquiry demands only that
the state of celebration's exercise of personal jurisdiction be
"consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."48 The parties' consent,"9 combined with the fact that the
marriage was celebrated in the state and the fact that the couple was
domiciled there for some time,'s would provide more than the
necessary "minimum contacts" to confer personal jurisdiction over the
dissolution."'
But the fact that the domicile rule is arguably incongruous with
modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is not itself an adequate
reason to depart from it.'52 Despite its anomalous nature, the domicile
rule has coexisted with the modern personal jurisdiction rules for
some decades and largely continues to govern American divorce
jurisprudence."' Even under these modern rules, the Court has shown
some deference to certain "traditional notions" governing personal
jurisdiction.' Thus, this Comment rejects jettisoning the domicile rule
146 See Insurance Corp of Ireland v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694,702 (1982)
(noting that personal jurisdiction restricts judicial power "not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty"); Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 52-53 (cited in note 10).
147 Burnham v Superior Court of California, 495 US 604, 619 (1990) (Scalia) (plurality)
("[Pihysical presence alone constitutes due process."). See also Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L
Rev at 52 (cited in note 10).
148 Burnham, 495 US at 618 (Scalia) (plurality), quoting International Shoe, 326 US at 316
(quotation marks omitted).
149 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc v Shute, 499 US 585, 593-95 (1991) (enforcing forum-
selection clause); Hess v Pawloski, 274 US 352,356-57 (1927).
150 Recall that in the migratory marriages at issue here, the parties will always have lived for
some time in the state of celebration. See text accompanying note 29.
151 The parties here would likely be held to have purposefully availed themselves of the
state's laws by marrying there and continuing to live there for some time. See Burger King Corp
v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 474-76 (1985) (noting jurisdiction when a defendant "purposefully
avails" himself of the "benefits and protections" of a state's law and particularly when the
defendant himself initiated that connection). Exercising personal jurisdiction over an absent
spouse would, however, still require proper service.
152 See, for example, In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 NW2d 869, 873-76 (Iowa 1991)
(discussing the divergent lines of cases but applying the domicile rule).
153 See notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
154 Burnham, 495 US at 609-10 (Scalia) (plurality). See also Shaffer, 433 US at 209 n 30.
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altogether on this basis, and attempts to give substantive meaning to
the domicile rule by seeking justifications for its departure from these
modern personal jurisdiction rules.
b) The reduced salience of state interests in controlling marriage
and divorce. It may simply be that, as some commentators argue, the
state interests that the Williams II and Alton courts found so
compelling have simply lost their salience with time.
Some have argued that any state interests that might have existed
at the time of Williams II and Alton have been eclipsed by the
heightened respect given to individual rights-in particular, by the
Supreme Court's recognition of constitutionally protected liberty
interests in marriage, divorce, and procreation."' Greater solicitude for
individual prerogatives in the area of family relations can be identified
in the Court's post-Williams II decisions, which base personal
jurisdiction for custody and child support actions on in personam
jurisdiction instead of domicile."' Indeed, as mentioned above, the
revolution in personal jurisdiction since the Court's seminal decision
in International Shoe has been seen to diminish the importance of
state interests as a consideration in personal jurisdiction decisions
altogether.'
Others have argued that the states themselves have effectively
abdicated their interest in controlling the domestic relations of their
citizens by eliminating sanctions against unmarried cohabitation and
making some of the rights and benefits of marriage available to
unmarried couples."' In particular, the widespread acceptance of
accessible, no-fault dissolution procedures has been seen as states
abdicating a policy of strictly regulating domestic relations.' Purely
from a pragmatic perspective, acceptance of no-fault divorce has
provided greater uniformity in substantive divorce law across states;
this not only limits the extent to which couples obtaining divorces in
other states will undermine their home state's substantive divorce law
if they travel abroad, but also, correspondingly, limits the incentive
that couples have to forum shop to begin with.' The potential
challenges to state interests that would arise from a loosening of the
domicile rule, therefore, are no longer as daunting as they once were.
155 See, for example, Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US 371, 375-77 (1971); Zablocki v Redhail,
434 US 374,383-91 (1978). See also Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 517-20 (cited in note 65).
156 Estin, 16 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 424-28 (cited in note 55).
157 See note 146 and accompanying text.
158 See Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 524-26 (cited in note 65).
159 See id at 522-23.
160 See id at 523-24.
161 A further, and more limited, argument is available to defend the particular state-of-
celebration dissolution laws discussed in Part III-that any state interests that might have
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Yet while the state interests that once justified the domicile rule
are no longer as persuasive in the modern era as they once were, these
recent developments do not suffice to completely undermine the
domicile rule. Long-standing traditions, which remain the touchstone
of the Court's federalism jurisprudence, place domestic relations
squarely within the province of states.16 Such traditions suggest that
states still have some legitimate interests in not allowing their
substantive divorce policy to be easily flouted-interests that cannot
be so easily dismissed. More limited rationales, discussed below, are
available to support the departure from the domicile rule advocated
here.
3. The domicile rule is an inapt tool to protect state interests in
determining who may marry.
That the domicile rule should not be jettisoned altogether,
however, does not mean that it should apply to the dissolutions of
migratory same-sex marriages at issue here. This Section and the next
evaluate the state interests that hostile states might articulate to
prevent states of celebration from exercising personal jurisdiction
over the divorce actions of hostile state domiciliaries." They suggest
that, in the case of migratory same-sex marriages, neither of these
state interests is sufficient to justify applying the domicile rule.
The more sweeping interest that hostile states might articulate
stems from their policy of refusing to perform or recognize same-sex
marriages-the same policy that has justified the refusal to perform
justified applying the domicile rule to marriages simply do not apply to civil unions (or domestic
partnerships) for two reasons: First, the "traditional notions" governing personal jurisdiction for
marriage (such as the domicile rule) need not necessarily apply to these new types of
relationships, which do not carry with them any traditions. Second, given that so many states
refuse to offer or recognize these new types of relationships, it is particularly understandable that
the state creating these statuses would retain the power to dissolve them. See, for example,
Miller-Jenkins v Miller-Jenkins, 912 A2d 951, 962-65 (Vt 2006) (holding that Vermont's reverse
evasion law applies solely to marriages and not civil unions). These civil union-specific
rationales may be seen as explaining the fact that civil union states have been the first to adopt
state-of-celebration dissolution laws. See Part III.B.
However, such civil union-specific rationales are problematic in that they are at odds with
statutory and state constitutional requirements in civil union-granting states, which require that
they be treated as similarly to marriages as possible. See, for example, Or Rev Stat § 106.340
(mandating equal treatment of civil unions and marriages in all respects); Strauss v Horton,
207 P3d 48, 77 (Cal 2009) (noting that although same-sex couples may be denied "marriage,"
they are constitutionally entitled to domestic partnerships identical "in all other respects").
162 See notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
163 Note that hostile states themselves need not assert these issues.These state interests may
be asserted by the parties, as they are every time one party contests personal jurisdiction. These
state interests may also be raised by the court itself, as in Alton.
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such divorces in the first place.164 The argument might be that, by
allowing divorces, states of celebration are recognizing and validating
the couples' marriages-necessarily undermining the hostile state's
policy that no such marriage can have existed to begin with. For
example, Texas might contend that Delaware, by dissolving a civil
union or marriage of Texas domiciliaries, is treating the couple as
having been married for the period during which the parties were
domiciled in the Texas. This, the argument goes, would violate a
domiciliary state's exclusive and sovereign interest in controlling who
may be married.
Ultimately, however, the vindication of such an interest is, for two
reasons, an unpersuasive rationale for applying the domicile rule to
bar state-of-celebration divorces.
a) The domicile rule is not intended to protect substantive marriage
policy. As an initial matter, there is a particular oddity in applying the
domicile rule to vindicate a hostile state's interest in having its
domiciliaries treated as unmarried. Recall that the original purpose of
the domicile rule as a rule of personal jurisdiction was to protect a
state's substantive divorce policy against the possibility of evasion.
That is, the domicile rule was crafted for the situation in which the
relevant difference in substantive law was whether one state
permitted a ground for divorce that another did not. The rule was
designed to prevent parties from circumventing state interests in, for
example, mitigating the collateral harms of an increased divorce rate
on children or society-in cases like Williams II and Alton, the
underlying validity of the marriages was simply not in dispute.
When the concern is that parties are evading a substantive
difference in marriage policy-that is, when the state interest sought
to be vindicated is whether a particular couple should be treated as
married-neither the domicile rule nor personal jurisdiction more
broadly have traditionally been necessary to vindicate state interests.
Rather, the rules of comity have come into play.'6 Though obviously
constrained by constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction, full
faith and credit, and choice of law, these rules reflect a different
balancing of the relevant state interests than the domicile rule (one
struck in favor of the state of domicile at the time of the marriage, in
164 See Chambers v Ormiston, 935 A2d 956,964-65 (RI 2007);J.B, 326 SW3d at 665-66.
165 This Comment takes such state interests, and the expression of them in nonrecognition
of same-sex marriages, as a given (if historically anomalous, see Part I; Part IV.A.3.a).
166 See notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
167 Admittedly, this is partly because marriage is not in itself the type of judicial proceeding
that generally calls for personal jurisdiction analysis.
168 See notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
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that comity principles generally permit states to void evasive
marriages of their domiciliaries but also generally require states to
recognize the migratory marriages at issue here if they were valid in
the state where contracted ).
This is not to suggest that states do not have legitimate interests
in refusing to perform or recognize same-sex marriages or that the
rules of comity could somehow replace rules of personal jurisdiction.
It is simply to suggest that the particular state interest in exclusively
controlling whether a couple is married was not the one that the
domicile rule, or personal jurisdiction more broadly, was intended to
protect-which calls into question its use to bar the dissolution of the
migratory same-sex marriages at issue here.
b) Hostile states do not have an exclusive interest over migratory
same-sex marriages. Even accepting that the domicile rule might be a
proper tool to protect a state's interests in determining who is
permitted to marry, a hostile state's interest in regulating the
migratory marriages at issue here is not the type of exclusive interest
that requires vindication via so strict a rule of personal jurisdiction
such as the domicile rule.
In the migratory marriages at issue here, the hostile state is
simply not the only state to have an interest in the marriage. Consider
that there is a clear limitation on the reach of any state's exclusive
interest in controlling the domestic relations of its domiciliaries: that
state interest applies, by definition, only to its domiciliaries. States of
celebration, too, have legitimate state interests in seeing that the legal
relationships of their own domiciliaries are validated, insulated from
evasion, and, if necessary, dissolved in an orderly fashion. And the
hostile state's interests, resulting from after-acquired domicile, do not
entirely wipe out the state of celebration's interests. After all, hostile
states cannot retroactively obliterate a same-sex marriage (nor any
attendant legal reliance on that marriage) that was validly created
long before the parties moved to the hostile state by, for example,
voiding migratory marriages from the date of their inception.o The
existence of the state of celebration's interests suggests that the
domicile rule, which exclusively vindicates the interests of domiciliary
states, should not apply here.
One might wonder whether the existence of the state of
celebration's interests makes a difference for the applicability of the
domicile rule, given that the domicile rule still applies in the typical
169 See text accompanying notes 29-32.
170 See notes 48-51 and accompanying text. See also Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States
at 69-81 (cited in note 26).
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migratory marriage case. That is to say, if both the state of celebration
and the new domiciliary state have interests in a migratory marriage,
then why has the domicile rule still traditionally applied to migratory
marriages?
The answer is simple: in the typical migratory marriage case, the
new domiciliary state has always given some respect to the
prerogatives of the state of celebration, by recognizing the migratory
marriage. As Professor Andrew Koppelman recounts, the complete
unwillingness of hostile states to recognize migratory marriages-even
for the limited purpose of dissolving them-is truly unprecedented in
American history."' The only types of marriages that have been
subject to such "blanket nonrecognition" are polygamous marriages
and the "core" cases of incest (parent-child or sibling marriages),
neither of which has ever been regularly performed by any US state.'72
Therefore, in the typical migratory marriage case, the new domiciliary
state has not sought to completely obliterate the legal interests
created in the state of celebration; even dissolution proceedings would
have, at a minimum, acknowledged that the couple's relationship once
existed. Accommodating the state of celebration's interests allowed
the domiciliary state to assert something approaching an exclusive
interest over the marital relationship at issue, which was sufficient to
justify the domicile rule.
But the same cannot be said for the current context of migratory
same-sex marriages. Hostile states such as Texas refuse to offer the
solutions-like recognizing migratory marriages or providing
divorces-that would normally take into account the competing
interests of states of celebration, thus undermining the reliance states
of celebration seek to encourage on marriages performed there."' By
refusing to grant the respect that has always been afforded to states of
celebration, hostile states leave the state of celebration's interests
unaddressed, and in need of consideration. And when the
accommodation of state-of-celebration interests that has permitted
new domiciliary states to assert an exclusive interest over migratory
marriages no longer applies, this suggests that the domicile rule, too,
should no longer apply.
171 Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States at 30-32,42-47 (cited in note 26).
172 Id (stating that no state has ever performed polygamous marriages or marriages
violating the core incest taboos-that is, parent-child or sibling marriages).
173 Texas has also rejected a compromise that would accommodate these interests, such as a
proceeding in the hostile state that "voids" the marriage only from the time the parties acquired
domicile in the hostile state and also provides a mechanism to unwind affairs from the period the
parties were domiciled in the state of celebration. See note 50.
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Indeed, it would be ironic that a rule of personal jurisdiction
would deny parties state-of-celebration divorces in the name of
protecting a hostile state's legitimate interests over the marital status
of its domiciliaries, when the parties' only other available option-a
voidness decree-does far more to impair legitimate state interests of
the state of celebration. This irony is particularly acute given that the
end result of a state-of-celebration dissolution -a declaration that the
parties are no longer married-largely conforms to the way that the
hostile state itself seeks to treat the parties (even if, in the process, it
requires the state of celebration to treat them as married)."4 Given
this, it is irrational for the strict personal jurisdiction requirement
embodied in the domicile rule to prevent state-of-celebration divorces
in order to vindicate the domiciliary state's interests in refusing to
treat same-sex couples as married.
4. State interests in regulating divorce do not justify applying
the domicile rule.
Hostile states, however, might articulate a more narrow interest
to justify the domicile rule than controlling their domiciliaries' marital
status. They might simply argue that, even if it is legitimate for another
state to treat its citizens as married, a domiciliary state ought to at
least have exclusive control over any proceeding in which its citizens
are divorced. After all, the potential for citizens to evade substantive
differences in divorce policy was the type of harm that the domicile
rule sought to address in the first place.17
a) Hostile states can assert little interest in applying their
substantive divorce law. While in the normal case, a state might have a
legitimate interest in applying its substantive divorce policy to any
divorce of its citizens-an interest that merits protecting with the
domicile rule-hostile states cannot assert any such interest with
regard to migratory same-sex marriages.
Certainly any interest the domiciliary state has in exclusively
applying its substantive divorce policy does not extend to the
downstream consequences of a divorce decree-for example, the
property divisions or child custody orders that may result. The
Supreme Court has permitted the more common requirements of in
174 Indeed, a hostile state might welcome innovations such as state-of-celebration divorces
that accommodate their "hostility" to same-sex marriages. After all, permitting state-of-
celebration divorces surely leaves the public policy of hostile states more intact than forcing
them to recognize same-sex marriages or perform same-sex divorces.
175 See notes 139-43 and accompanying text. To the extent that such a divorce policy
includes not treating same-sex couples as married to begin with, the rationales discussed in
Part IV.A.3 suggest that the domicile rule should not apply to vindicate it.
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personam jurisdiction to govern these downstream actions."1 6 These
rules therefore reflect a determination that domiciliary states simply
do not have the type of exclusive interest over adjudications for
custody and support that would call for as strict a rule of personal
jurisdiction as the domicile rule. A hostile state is therefore already
required to permit other states to adjudicate custody or support
determinations over all of its domiciliaries -whether different-sex
couples or same-sex couples-who obtained a declaration of divorce
before moving to the hostile state. The state's interest over the custody
and support determinations of same-sex couples with migratory
marriages is not so heightened as to require a different result for them
alone.
More fundamentally, it is difficult to understand how a hostile
state can have any interest in exclusively controlling the dissolution
(or downstream consequences) of a legal relationship whose very
existence it vehemently rejects in the first place. After all, hostile
states are not refusing to divorce same-sex couples because these
couples have not met the requisite grounds for divorce or have failed
to follow the proper divorce procedures. Rather, hostile states have
refused to even exercise jurisdiction over actions for same-sex divorce,
contending that there is simply no legal entity that could properly be
the subject of a legal action in the first place."' As the court in J.B. put
it, "If a trial court were to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a
same-sex divorce petition, even if only to deny the petition, it would
give that petition some legal effect."' The proper response to a same-
sex marriage, the court concluded, is simply to give it "no legal
effect."..
If a same-sex marriage is not a legal entity akin to a different-sex
marriage, however, it is hardly apparent why it should simultaneously
be treated just like a different-sex marriage for purposes of the
domicile rule. That is to say, a state refusing to consider a relationship
a marriage simply should not be able to simultaneously assert an
176 See text accompanying note 76.
177 See notes 37-45 and accompanying text. Such a determination is arguably suspect under
the Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v Fetter, 341 US 609,611 (1951).
178 326 SW3d at 665. The court's holding that respecting a same-sex marriage would be like
"administer[ing] the estate of a living person," see id at 666, can be seen as consistent with legal
theories holding that same-sex marriages are, by definition, simply not marriages because
marriage involves only different-sex couples. See Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of
Marriage, 21 Can J Fam L 11, 84 ("Same sex couples look to the law to let them into the
privileged institution [of marriage], and the law... may want to, but it cannot; it can only give
them access to a different institution of a different value.").
179 J.B., 326 SW3d at 665 (determining that the only way to avoid giving the same-sex
marriage effect was to reject jurisdiction).
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exclusive and sovereign interest over how it is dissolved. Any such
interest a hostile state could assert would be required to begin from
the proposition that the same-sex couple, in fact, had a relationship to
dissolve in the first place-an acknowledgement by the hostile state
that there was "a legally recognized relationship between the parties
that [one of them] seeks to alter."' This is precisely the position such
states reject-as the Texas court did in J.B.'
Applying the domicile rule to forbid state-of-celebration divorces
would, in effect, permit hostile states to have their nonrecognition
cake and eat it, too-by allowing hostile states to enjoy (via the
domicile rule) the exclusive control over a domestic relationship the
interstate system traditionally affords domiciliary states, even though
hostile states have refused to grant the respect traditionally afforded a
domestic relationship created by other states. There is no evidence
that the domicile rule was intended to produce such a result.
b) DOMA provides additional justifications for granting state-of-
celebration divorces. The Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause
generally requires that the judgments of one state be recognized in
other states.m' But in 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage
Act"' (DOMA), which expressly authorizes states to refuse recognition
to validly obtained judgments from another state if they "respect[] a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage ... or a right or claim arising from such relationship."' By
enacting DOMA, Congress fundamentally changed the full faith and
credit baseline for recognition of same-sex marriages."' While DOMA
obviously contributes to the nonrecognition of same-sex marriages, it
180 Id at 667.
181 Id (noting that Texas law does not contemplate same-sex divorce because "[a] person
does not and cannot seek a divorce without simultaneously asserting the existence and validity
of a lawful marriage").
182 US Const Art IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."). See also Baker v General Motors
Corp, 522 US 222,234 (1998) ("[O]ur decisions support no roving 'public policy exception' to the
full faith and credit due judgments.").
183 Pub L 104-199,110 Stat 2419, codified at 1 USC § 7 and 28 USC § 1738C.
184 DOMA § 2,28 USC § 1738C.
185 See, for example, Kramer, 106 Yale L J at 2001 (cited in note 31). The "unprecedentedly
selective" effect of DOMA on full faith and credit has led some to believe that it an improper
exercise of Congress's full faith and credit power. See, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Dumb
and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 Iowa L Rev 1, 18-24
(1997). Note, however, that the provision of DOMA at issue above, which affects states, is distinct
from the provision of DOMA controlling the definition of marriage for federal purposes. 1 USC
§ 7. Recent constitutional litigation has centered entirely around this latter (federal) provision
and leaves the former intact. See Gill v Office of Personnel Management, 699 F Supp 2d 374,
376-79 (D Mass 2010) (distinguishing the two provisions and noting limitation of holding to the
federal provision).
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does provide two independent rationales for suggesting that the
domicile rule should not apply to bar state-of-celebration divorces.
First, DOMA substantially reduces the injury to the hostile state's
interests in controlling dissolutions. Consider that a key concern that
led the Williams II Court to expound the domicile rule was the
binding impact of nondomiciliary divorces on other states; the Court
worried that domiciliary states like North Carolina would be
"seriously affected"-indeed bound-by these judgments."' This
rationale, however, no longer supports applying the domicile rule to
the same-sex marriage context, because hostile states are not bound
by these judgments. DOMA, by its plain text, entitles hostile states to
completely ignore a state-of-celebration divorce (and, potentially, any
downstream judgments) as "arising from" a same-sex marriage.
Hostile states, released from any obligation to recognize the
consequences of these marriages, therefore have less of a need for the
domicile rule to protect their interests.
Simultaneously, DOMA's change to the full faith and credit
baseline heightens the state of celebration's interest in controlling
dissolutions. As the logic of the Williams II Court suggests, full faith
and credit is inextricably linked to limits on personal jurisdiction in
that it determines the consequences of limiting a state's personal
jurisdiction. This link is more explicitly illustrated in Shaffer v
Heitner,"' in which the Court rejected Delaware's attempt to found
personal jurisdiction over a corporation and its officers on the fact
that its law made "Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock in
Delaware corporations."'. Heitner, in defense of the Delaware law,
argued that a loose jurisdictional rule was necessary-that
"jurisdiction should be recognized without regard to whether the
property is [actuallyl present in the State"' -because otherwise a
debtor might "avoid payment of his obligations by the expedient of
removing his assets to a place where he is not subject to an in
personam suit.".o The Court rejected this contention, reasoning that
any concerns regarding evasion were assuaged by the fact that "[t]he
Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the valid in personam
judgment of one State enforceable in all other States."'
What Shaffer illustrates is that full faith and credit may be seen as
the spoonful of sugar to help distasteful medicine-namely, personal
186 Williams I, 325 US at 230. See also id at 232.
187 433 US 186 (1977).
188 Id at 189-93.
189 Id at 210.
190 Id, quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 66 comment a.
191 Shaffer, 433 US at 210.
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jurisdiction's stringent limits on states-go down. Though states might
wish to exercise universal personal jurisdiction and exert
extraterritorial control (as Delaware effectively attempted to do in
Shaffer), they are limited in their ability to do so. Full faith and credit,
however, lowers the stakes of that limitation on a state's personal
jurisdiction, because what is taken away is replaced by the full faith
and credit that one's own judgments will obtain, thus ensuring that
their consequences can be enforced.
Since its inception, the domicile rule's strict personal jurisdiction
limitation on states has been balanced by the full faith and credit
afforded to properly undertaken state judgments. States could not
grant nondomiciliary divorces, but they were assured that their own
divorce decrees would be entitled to respect elsewhere, and that
marriages celebrated there could be dissolved elsewhere (and, under
full faith and credit, the dissolution would be binding even in the state
of celebration). But when Congress, as it has with DOMA, begins to
deprive states of their "sugar"-that is, when it deprives their
marriages and their judgments of full faith and credit-this balance
breaks down. States, aware that their marriages and divorce decrees
may not be afforded respect elsewhere, thus have an incentive to
expand the extraterritorial reach of their courts and laws-that is, they
have a heightened interest in controlling the dissolution. Given the
strong relationship between full faith and credit and personal
jurisdiction Shaffer illustrates, such an increase in the reach of a state's
personal jurisdiction is neither surprising nor, necessarily, outside the
proper limits of state authority. Thus, in the context of same-sex
marriages, the loosening of the domicile rule is buttressed by DOMA's
alteration of long-standing full faith and credit principles.
5. Pragmatic considerations may trump hostile state interests.
The rules of personal jurisdiction are not blind to pragmatic
considerations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that personal
jurisdiction doctrine does not lend itself to bright-line rules.19 One
reason for this is that an important purpose of the Court's personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence is to ensure the "orderly administration of
the laws." 93 This is no small task, given that the Court must
simultaneously create a workable legal system to unify the fifty-two
different American jurisdictions (the states, the District of Columbia,
192 See Kulko v Superior Court of California, 436 US 84, 92 (1978) ("We recognize that this
determination is one in which few answers will be written in black and white. The greys are
dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.").
193 International Shoe, 326 US at 319.
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and the federal system) while respecting the sovereignty of each state.
The Court has thus been particularly attuned to the practical contexts
and consequences of its personal jurisdiction holdings; indeed, the
Court has described pragmatic concerns as a primary impetus for the
modern revolution in personal jurisdiction.194
Thus, when the system of personal jurisdiction produces extreme
hardships for individuals, we might expect that the ability of states to
address such a problem in a limited fashion would be afforded some
respect-even though the solution might not comport with bright-line
rules or rigid conceptions of state interests. This has been the case with
deviations from the domicile rule for military personnel; these limited
provisions, which address a significant hardship to such personnel,
have existed in some states since at least the middle of the last
century.' Therefore, the extreme difficulties created by leaving same-
sex couples with no forum in which to divorce might, itself, be a
sufficient reason to suggest that the strict rules of personal
jurisdiction- and the rigid conceptions of state interests-might need
to give way.
The solution offered here - state-of-celebration divorce-
requires only a limited exception to personal jurisdiction's current
rules. While it intrudes on a long-standing tenet of personal
jurisdiction, it does so to address a truly unprecedented situation-
complete refusal to recognize migratory marriages-that creates
unprecedented hardships. And it intrudes on that tenet of personal
jurisdiction only as far as necessary to address that problem, by
limiting itself to migratory marriages-and then only to those
marriages the domiciliary state refuses to dissolve or even recognize
as marriages. Finally, instead of throwing the doors open to any other
state that might wish to provide a forum for such divorces, it offers
only one forum as an alternative-a forum whose relationship to the
marriage at issue is substantial. The principles that support the
domicile rule should give way to allow such a limited and carefully
crafted solution.
194 See Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 250-51 (1958) (citing the "increased [] flow of
commerce between States," and "progress in communications and transportation" as justifying the
evolution "from the rigid rule of Pennoyer ... to the flexible standard of International Shoe").
195 Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 20-21 (cited in note 10) (discussing states that
permit military personnel to obtain divorces even absent domicile and arguing that this
demonstrates states' awareness of the hardships created by being unable to obtain a divorce).
But see Viernes v District Court, 509 P2d 306, 310 (Colo 1973) (invaliding a statute permitting
nondomiciliary military personnel to obtain divorces as inconsistent with the domicile rule).
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B. The Domicile Rule as a Choice-of-Law Rule
Although the domicile rule has traditionally been thought of as a
rule governing personal jurisdiction, it can also be understood as a
rule expressing constitutional constraints on choice of law. Yet, as
explained below, these choice-of-law constraints do not justify the
domicile rule any more than the constraints governing personal
jurisdiction.
Choice-of-law principles, which are limited constitutionally by
due process and full faith and credit, determine the substantive law
that applies to a particular controversy. These principles lower the
stakes of finding personal jurisdiction, because the fact that an action
may be heard in a state does not, under choice of law, necessarily
require applying the substantive law of that state.'
But choice-of-law principles have been entirely absent from
divorce actions, because the state in which divorce actions are brought
has always applied its own substantive law (a rule that makes sense
when at least one of the parties is necessarily domiciled there)." This
link between forum and choice of law heightens the stakes of any
determination regarding personal jurisdiction in the divorce context.
In any other legal controversy, the choice of forum need only meet the
constitutional constraints regarding personal jurisdiction, because
another substantive law might apply. In divorce actions, however, the
forum must satisfy constitutional constraints regarding personal
jurisdiction and the application of forum law must satisfy
constitutional choice-of-law constraints.
It follows, then, that the domicile rule, as a rule governing divorce,
operates both as a rule of personal jurisdiction (requiring the divorce
to be heard in the state of domicile) and (because the substantive law
follows that determination) as a rule governing choice of law. And
some commentators, most notably Professor David Currie, have
further understood the domicile rule as the result of constitutional
constraints governing choice of law, not personal jurisdiction.' As
Currie noted, "[T]he paramount interest of the domicile" was
expressed in what he claimed was a "constitutional requirement that
[the domicile's] law be applied."'. Under this logic, Williams II and
Alton might be seen as having folded the choice-of-law requirement
that the domicile law apply into the personal jurisdiction inquiry, on
196 Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 2 (cited in note 10).
197 Id at 2,19-20 (referring to this as the "choice-of-law corollary" to the domicile rule). See
also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 285.
198 See Currie, 34 U Chi L Rev at 48-53 (cited in note 134); Wasserman, Wm & Mary L Rev
at 53-54 (cited in note 10). See also Alton, 207 F2d at 684-85 (Hastie dissenting).
199 Currie, 34 U Chi L Rev at 48 (cited in note 134).
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the assumption that they both must lead to the same result.20
Buttressing this claim is the fact that, as some commentators have
noted,201 Alton's main holding relies exclusively on cases dealing with
choice of law, and not personal jurisdiction.
If the constitutional constraints on choice of law did dictate the
domicile rule, one way to address the issue would simply be to undo
the link between forum and substantive law and add a choice-of-law
component when divorce jurisdiction is extended beyond domicile.202
However, such an endeavor not only creates practical difficulties in
fashioning choice-of-law principles (and flies in the face of long-
standing divorce practice) but also leads to particular problems for
providing a forum for same-sex divorces. A rule that provided a forum
in the state of celebration, only to apply the law of a hostile state (a
likely choice of law because it is the couple's domicile), might lead to
the same result as if the action had been brought in a hostile state-no
divorce. Thus, as noted above, the legislative solutions in Part III
contain provisions addressing choice of law by specifying that their
own substantive law should apply to a divorce granted there, leaving
intact the correlation between forum and substantive law.
But do these statutes-dictating that state-of-celebration divorces
be governed by state-of-celebration law-violate constitutional
constraints on choice of law? The answer, despite Professor Currie's
objections, is almost certainly no-at least for the migratory divorces
at issue here. Certainly the domicile rule is not necessary to ensure
that the choice of law in any action comports with constitutional
constraints, because choice of law is an issue that may be waived. Both
parties could simply consent to the application of the state of
celebration's law-in which case the domicile rule serves only to
thwart their mutual consent as to the governing law. .
But even in cases where choice of law is contested, there is no
reason for the domicile rule to serve as a bright-line rule limiting
choice of law to that of the parties' domicile. For the migratory
marriages at issue here, applying the substantive law of the state of
celebration to the divorce action would most likely pass constitutional
muster. In Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts,m the Court held that, for a
200 Currie sought to escape the domicile rule by unlinking the choice of forum and choice of
law and arguing that the paramount concern was application of domiciliary law, whatever the
forum. See id at 48-53. This Comment takes a different approach, preserving the link between
forum and choice of law.
201 See, for example, Garfield, 58 Tex L Rev at 515 (cited in note 65).
202 See id at 535-39.
203 See id at 536.
204 472 US 797 (1985).
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choice-of-law analysis, all the Constitution requires is that a state have
"a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.,20 This test can be easily met by the state-of-
celebration divorces discussed in this Comment. The same factors that
combine to give rise to personal jurisdiction under the modern
regime-in particular, the fact that the state of celebration is the place
where the marriage took place and the fact that the parties were
domiciled there-would likely qualify as "a significant contact," if not
a "significant aggregation of contacts," to satisfy the Phillips test and
allow application of the state of celebration's substantive law over a
divorce action.20 And any interests hostile states have in applying their
own law would be subject to the same criticisms as their interests in
controlling personal jurisdiction.0 o
It is true that the domicile rule is a convenient shorthand for
choice-of-law analysis. It provides a forum (the domiciliary state) in
which applying the substantive law is generally appropriate. It also
avoids some fora in which applying substantive law would obviously
not be appropriate (such as a state to which no party had any ties).
But the domicile rule cannot be said, by any measure, to be mandated
by constitutional constraints on choice of law, any more than the
modern rules of personal jurisdiction or the state interests at play
mandate the domicile rule.
CONCLUSION
One might well wonder what effect a divorce decree enabled by
this solution may have in a world in which the reciprocality that
normally characterizes our legal system has broken down and in
which states are encouraged by federal law to ignore marriages and
divorce decrees from neighboring states. Couldn't a couple's
domiciliary state (or another hostile state) simply refuse to respect a
same-sex divorce, the way it refuses to respect a same-sex marriage or
civil union?
205 Id at 818, quoting Allstate Insurance Co v Hague, 449 US 302,312-13 (1981) (Brennan)
(plurality) (quotation marks omitted).
206 See text accompanying notes 149-51. See also Wasserman, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev at 54
(cited in note 10). The state of celebration here can certainly articulate interests-such as
protecting the reliance that has developed on the relationship and providing the parties with an
orderly procedure for unwinding their affairs-that are at least as compelling as those deemed
sufficient by the plurality in Allstate (and are certainly more related to the substantive law
sought to be applied). 449 US at 313-20.
207 See Parts IVA.3-4.
2011] 1625
The University of Chicago Law Review
Indeed it might.2 8 But, even in this "worst case" scenario, the
parties would still, at a minimum, have achieved something significant:
dissolution of their status in the state where their marriage or civil
union was formed. Such a dissolution decree (and any obligations
flowing from it) would also likely be recognized in other friendly
states under normal full faith and credit principles, even if it might not
be respected in hostile ones. This is a large step forward, since the
friendly states where such a divorce decree would be respected are the
ones that were likely to treat the couple as married to begin with, even
if their hostile domiciliary state did not.00 And given the political
realities that greet same-sex couples in marriages and civil unions,
such a limited solution may be the only feasible option for couples
such as J.B. and H.B.
Justice Robert Jackson once wrote, "If there is one thing that the
people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers, it is rules of law
that will enable individuals to tell whether they are married."210
Married same-sex couples living in hostile states do not enjoy this
certainty. Instead, they face an entirely uncertain and treacherous
environment in which they have no simple mechanism to exit a
relationship that imposes substantial legal rights and responsibilities.
The solution advanced in this Comment suggests one possible
mechanism for these couples and provides the possibility of
unwinding their assets and providing closure to their relationships in
an orderly fashion. The domicile rule-a rule designed to protect
entirely different set of state interests -should not create a
constitutional barrier to the certainty that would be afforded these
couples by obtaining a divorce decree, even if that decree is obtained
in the state of celebration.
208 See text accompanying notes 184-86. See also J.B., 326 SW3d at 666. But see Miller-
Jenkins, which at least suggests that child custody orders might be respected in such a hostile
state. 637 SE2d at 333-35 (holding that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 USC
§ 1738A, foreclosed the lower court in Virginia from exercising jurisdiction over child custody
issues when Vermont already had).
209 See note 13 and accompanying text.
210 Estin v Estin, 334 US 541,553 (1948) (Jackson dissenting).
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